11 files changed, 3418 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/cryptsettings/Android.mk b/crypto/cryptsettings/Android.mk
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9e7aa5f38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/cryptsettings/Android.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+LOCAL_PATH:= $(call my-dir)
+include $(CLEAR_VARS)
+
+LOCAL_SRC_FILES:= \
+	cryptsettings.c
+LOCAL_CFLAGS:= -g -c -W
+LOCAL_MODULE:=cryptsettings
+LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS:= eng
+LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libc libcutils
+LOCAL_STATIC_LIBRARIES += libfs_mgrtwrp
+LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := UTILITY_EXECUTABLES
+LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(PRODUCT_OUT)/utilities
+include $(BUILD_EXECUTABLE)
diff --git a/crypto/cryptsettings/cryptsettings.c b/crypto/cryptsettings/cryptsettings.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..79fad7198
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/cryptsettings/cryptsettings.c
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include "../crypto/fs_mgr/include/fs_mgr.h"
+
+#include "cutils/properties.h"
+
+#ifndef PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX
+#define PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX 255
+#endif
+#ifndef FSTAB_PREFIX
+#define FSTAB_PREFIX "/fstab."
+#endif
+
+int main(void)
+{
+	char prop[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+	char key_loc[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+	char blk_dev[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+	char fstab_filename[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX + sizeof(FSTAB_PREFIX)];
+
+	printf("This tool will gather the build flags needed for decryption support for TWRP.\n");
+	printf("This tool comes with no warranties whatsoever.\n");
+	printf("http://teamw.in\n\n");
+	property_get("ro.crypto.state", prop, "encrypted");
+	if (strcmp(prop, "encrypted") != 0)
+		printf("Your device is not encrypted, continuing anyway.\n\nTW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO := true\n");
+	property_get("ro.crypto.fs_type", prop, "ERROR");
+	printf("TW_CRYPTO_FS_TYPE := \"%s\"\n", prop);
+	property_get("ro.crypto.fs_real_blkdev", prop, "ERROR");
+	printf("TW_CRYPTO_REAL_BLKDEV := \"%s\"\n", prop);
+	property_get("ro.crypto.fs_mnt_point", prop, "ERROR");
+	printf("TW_CRYPTO_MNT_POINT := \"%s\"\n", prop);
+	property_get("ro.crypto.fs_options", prop, "ERROR");
+	printf("TW_CRYPTO_FS_OPTIONS := \"%s\"\n", prop);
+	property_get("ro.crypto.fs_flags", prop, "ERROR");
+	printf("TW_CRYPTO_FS_FLAGS := \"%s\"\n", prop);
+	property_get("ro.crypto.keyfile.userdata", prop, "footer");
+	printf("TW_CRYPTO_KEY_LOC := \"%s\"\n", prop);
+	printf("\n*** NEW FOR JELLY BEAN:\n");
+	strcpy(fstab_filename, FSTAB_PREFIX);
+	property_get("ro.hardware", fstab_filename + sizeof(FSTAB_PREFIX) - 1, "");
+	fs_mgr_get_crypt_info(fstab_filename, key_loc, blk_dev, sizeof(key_loc));
+	printf("fstab file location: '%s'\n\nTW_INCLUDE_JB_CRYPTO := true\n", fstab_filename);
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/fs_mgr/Android.mk b/crypto/fs_mgr/Android.mk
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8834282e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/fs_mgr/Android.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Copyright 2011 The Android Open Source Project
+
+LOCAL_PATH:= $(call my-dir)
+include $(CLEAR_VARS)
+
+LOCAL_SRC_FILES:= fs_mgr.c
+
+LOCAL_C_INCLUDES := $(LOCAL_PATH)/include
+
+LOCAL_MODULE:= libfs_mgrtwrp
+LOCAL_EXPORT_C_INCLUDE_DIRS := $(LOCAL_PATH)/include
+
+include $(BUILD_STATIC_LIBRARY)
+
+
+
+#include $(CLEAR_VARS)
+
+#LOCAL_SRC_FILES:= fs_mgr_main.c
+
+#LOCAL_C_INCLUDES := $(LOCAL_PATH)/include
+
+#LOCAL_MODULE:= fs_mgr
+
+#LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
+#LOCAL_FORCE_STATIC_EXECUTABLE := true
+#LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_ROOT_OUT)/sbin
+#LOCAL_UNSTRIPPED_PATH := $(TARGET_ROOT_OUT_UNSTRIPPED)
+
+#LOCAL_STATIC_LIBRARIES := libfs_mgr libcutils libc
+
+#include $(BUILD_EXECUTABLE)
+
diff --git a/crypto/fs_mgr/fs_mgr.c b/crypto/fs_mgr/fs_mgr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0361ab8bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/fs_mgr/fs_mgr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,611 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+/* TO DO:
+ *   1. Re-direct fsck output to the kernel log?
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include <private/android_filesystem_config.h>
+#include <cutils/partition_utils.h>
+#include <cutils/properties.h>
+
+#include "fs_mgr_priv.h"
+
+#define KEY_LOC_PROP   "ro.crypto.keyfile.userdata"
+#define KEY_IN_FOOTER  "footer"
+
+#define E2FSCK_BIN      "/system/bin/e2fsck"
+
+struct flag_list {
+    const char *name;
+    unsigned flag;
+};
+
+static struct flag_list mount_flags[] = {
+    { "noatime",    MS_NOATIME },
+    { "noexec",     MS_NOEXEC },
+    { "nosuid",     MS_NOSUID },
+    { "nodev",      MS_NODEV },
+    { "nodiratime", MS_NODIRATIME },
+    { "ro",         MS_RDONLY },
+    { "rw",         0 },
+    { "remount",    MS_REMOUNT },
+    { "defaults",   0 },
+    { 0,            0 },
+};
+
+static struct flag_list fs_mgr_flags[] = {
+    { "wait",        MF_WAIT },
+    { "check",       MF_CHECK },
+    { "encryptable=",MF_CRYPT },
+    { "defaults",    0 },
+    { 0,             0 },
+};
+
+/*
+ * gettime() - returns the time in seconds of the system's monotonic clock or
+ * zero on error.
+ */
+static time_t gettime(void)
+{
+    struct timespec ts;
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        ERROR("clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return ts.tv_sec;
+}
+
+static int wait_for_file(const char *filename, int timeout)
+{
+    struct stat info;
+    time_t timeout_time = gettime() + timeout;
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    while (gettime() < timeout_time && ((ret = stat(filename, &info)) < 0))
+        usleep(10000);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int parse_flags(char *flags, struct flag_list *fl, char **key_loc,
+                       char *fs_options, int fs_options_len)
+{
+    int f = 0;
+    int i;
+    char *p;
+    char *savep;
+
+    /* initialize key_loc to null, if we find an MF_CRYPT flag,
+     * then we'll set key_loc to the proper value */
+    if (key_loc) {
+        *key_loc = NULL;
+    }
+    /* initialize fs_options to the null string */
+    if (fs_options && (fs_options_len > 0)) {
+        fs_options[0] = '\0';
+    }
+
+    p = strtok_r(flags, ",", &savep);
+    while (p) {
+        /* Look for the flag "p" in the flag list "fl"
+         * If not found, the loop exits with fl[i].name being null.
+         */
+        for (i = 0; fl[i].name; i++) {
+            if (!strncmp(p, fl[i].name, strlen(fl[i].name))) {
+                f |= fl[i].flag;
+                if ((fl[i].flag == MF_CRYPT) && key_loc) {
+                    /* The encryptable flag is followed by an = and the
+                     * location of the keys.  Get it and return it.
+                     */
+                    *key_loc = strdup(strchr(p, '=') + 1);
+                }
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (!fl[i].name) {
+            if (fs_options) {
+                /* It's not a known flag, so it must be a filesystem specific
+                 * option.  Add it to fs_options if it was passed in.
+                 */
+                strlcat(fs_options, p, fs_options_len);
+                strlcat(fs_options, ",", fs_options_len);
+            } else {
+                /* fs_options was not passed in, so if the flag is unknown
+                 * it's an error.
+                 */
+                ERROR("Warning: unknown flag %s\n", p);
+            }
+        }
+        p = strtok_r(NULL, ",", &savep);
+    }
+
+out:
+    if (fs_options && fs_options[0]) {
+        /* remove the last trailing comma from the list of options */
+        fs_options[strlen(fs_options) - 1] = '\0';
+    }
+
+    return f;
+}
+
+/* Read a line of text till the next newline character.
+ * If no newline is found before the buffer is full, continue reading till a new line is seen,
+ * then return an empty buffer.  This effectively ignores lines that are too long.
+ * On EOF, return null.
+ */
+static char *getline(char *buf, int size, FILE *file)
+{
+    int cnt = 0;
+    int eof = 0;
+    int eol = 0;
+    int c;
+
+    if (size < 1) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    while (cnt < (size - 1)) {
+        c = getc(file);
+        if (c == EOF) {
+            eof = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        *(buf + cnt) = c;
+        cnt++;
+
+        if (c == '\n') {
+            eol = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Null terminate what we've read */
+    *(buf + cnt) = '\0';
+
+    if (eof) {
+        if (cnt) {
+            return buf;
+        } else {
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    } else if (eol) {
+        return buf;
+    } else {
+        /* The line is too long.  Read till a newline or EOF.
+         * If EOF, return null, if newline, return an empty buffer.
+         */
+        while(1) {
+            c = getc(file);
+            if (c == EOF) {
+                return NULL;
+            } else if (c == '\n') {
+                *buf = '\0';
+                return buf;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+static struct fstab_rec *read_fstab(char *fstab_path)
+{
+    FILE *fstab_file;
+    int cnt, entries;
+    int len;
+    char line[256];
+    const char *delim = " \t";
+    char *save_ptr, *p;
+    struct fstab_rec *fstab;
+    char *key_loc;
+#define FS_OPTIONS_LEN 1024
+    char tmp_fs_options[FS_OPTIONS_LEN];
+
+    fstab_file = fopen(fstab_path, "r");
+    if (!fstab_file) {
+        ERROR("Cannot open file %s\n", fstab_path);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    entries = 0;
+    while (getline(line, sizeof(line), fstab_file)) {
+        /* if the last character is a newline, shorten the string by 1 byte */
+        len = strlen(line);
+        if (line[len - 1] == '\n') {
+            line[len - 1] = '\0';
+        }
+        /* Skip any leading whitespace */
+        p = line;
+        while (isspace(*p)) {
+            p++;
+        }
+        /* ignore comments or empty lines */
+        if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0')
+            continue;
+        entries++;
+    }
+
+    if (!entries) {
+        ERROR("No entries found in fstab\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    fstab = calloc(entries + 1, sizeof(struct fstab_rec));
+
+    fseek(fstab_file, 0, SEEK_SET);
+
+    cnt = 0;
+    while (getline(line, sizeof(line), fstab_file)) {
+        /* if the last character is a newline, shorten the string by 1 byte */
+        len = strlen(line);
+        if (line[len - 1] == '\n') {
+            line[len - 1] = '\0';
+        }
+
+        /* Skip any leading whitespace */
+        p = line;
+        while (isspace(*p)) {
+            p++;
+        }
+        /* ignore comments or empty lines */
+        if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0')
+            continue;
+
+        /* If a non-comment entry is greater than the size we allocated, give an
+         * error and quit.  This can happen in the unlikely case the file changes
+         * between the two reads.
+         */
+        if (cnt >= entries) {
+            ERROR("Tried to process more entries than counted\n");
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if (!(p = strtok_r(line, delim, &save_ptr))) {
+            ERROR("Error parsing mount source\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+        fstab[cnt].blk_dev = strdup(p);
+
+        if (!(p = strtok_r(NULL, delim, &save_ptr))) {
+            ERROR("Error parsing mnt_point\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+        fstab[cnt].mnt_point = strdup(p);
+
+        if (!(p = strtok_r(NULL, delim, &save_ptr))) {
+            ERROR("Error parsing fs_type\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+        fstab[cnt].type = strdup(p);
+
+        if (!(p = strtok_r(NULL, delim, &save_ptr))) {
+            ERROR("Error parsing mount_flags\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+        tmp_fs_options[0] = '\0';
+        fstab[cnt].flags = parse_flags(p, mount_flags, 0, tmp_fs_options, FS_OPTIONS_LEN);
+
+        /* fs_options are optional */
+        if (tmp_fs_options[0]) {
+            fstab[cnt].fs_options = strdup(tmp_fs_options);
+        } else {
+            fstab[cnt].fs_options = NULL;
+        }
+
+        if (!(p = strtok_r(NULL, delim, &save_ptr))) {
+            ERROR("Error parsing fs_mgr_options\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
+        fstab[cnt].fs_mgr_flags = parse_flags(p, fs_mgr_flags, &key_loc, 0, 0);
+        fstab[cnt].key_loc = key_loc;
+
+        cnt++;
+    }
+    fclose(fstab_file);
+
+    return fstab;
+}
+
+static void free_fstab(struct fstab_rec *fstab)
+{
+    int i = 0;
+
+    while (fstab[i].blk_dev) {
+        /* Free the pointers return by strdup(3) */
+        free(fstab[i].blk_dev);
+        free(fstab[i].mnt_point);
+        free(fstab[i].type);
+        free(fstab[i].fs_options);
+        free(fstab[i].key_loc);
+
+        i++;
+    }
+
+    /* Free the actual fstab array created by calloc(3) */
+    free(fstab);
+}
+
+static void check_fs(char *blk_dev, char *type)
+{
+    pid_t pid;
+    int status;
+
+    /* Check for the types of filesystems we know how to check */
+    if (!strcmp(type, "ext2") || !strcmp(type, "ext3") || !strcmp(type, "ext4")) {
+        INFO("Running %s on %s\n", E2FSCK_BIN, blk_dev);
+        pid = fork();
+        if (pid > 0) {
+            /* Parent, wait for the child to return */
+            waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
+        } else if (pid == 0) {
+            /* child, run checker */
+            execlp(E2FSCK_BIN, E2FSCK_BIN, "-y", blk_dev, (char *)NULL);
+
+            /* Only gets here on error */
+            ERROR("Cannot run fs_mgr binary %s\n", E2FSCK_BIN);
+        } else {
+            /* No need to check for error in fork, we can't really handle it now */
+            ERROR("Fork failed trying to run %s\n", E2FSCK_BIN);
+        }
+    }
+
+    return;
+}
+
+static void remove_trailing_slashes(char *n)
+{
+    int len;
+
+    len = strlen(n) - 1;
+    while ((*(n + len) == '/') && len) {
+      *(n + len) = '\0';
+      len--;
+    }
+}
+
+static int fs_match(char *in1, char *in2)
+{
+    char *n1;
+    char *n2;
+    int ret;
+
+    n1 = strdup(in1);
+    n2 = strdup(in2);
+
+    remove_trailing_slashes(n1);
+    remove_trailing_slashes(n2);
+
+    ret = !strcmp(n1, n2);
+
+    free(n1);
+    free(n2);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int fs_mgr_mount_all(char *fstab_file)
+{
+    int i = 0;
+    int encrypted = 0;
+    int ret = -1;
+    int mret;
+    struct fstab_rec *fstab = 0;
+
+    if (!(fstab = read_fstab(fstab_file))) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; fstab[i].blk_dev; i++) {
+        if (fstab[i].fs_mgr_flags & MF_WAIT) {
+            wait_for_file(fstab[i].blk_dev, WAIT_TIMEOUT);
+        }
+
+        if (fstab[i].fs_mgr_flags & MF_CHECK) {
+            check_fs(fstab[i].blk_dev, fstab[i].type);
+        }
+
+        mret = mount(fstab[i].blk_dev, fstab[i].mnt_point, fstab[i].type,
+                     fstab[i].flags, fstab[i].fs_options);
+        if (!mret) {
+            /* Success!  Go get the next one */
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* mount(2) returned an error, check if it's encrypted and deal with it */
+        if ((fstab[i].fs_mgr_flags & MF_CRYPT) && !partition_wiped(fstab[i].blk_dev)) {
+            /* Need to mount a tmpfs at this mountpoint for now, and set
+             * properties that vold will query later for decrypting
+             */
+            if (mount("tmpfs", fstab[i].mnt_point, "tmpfs",
+                  MS_NOATIME | MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV, CRYPTO_TMPFS_OPTIONS) < 0) {
+                ERROR("Cannot mount tmpfs filesystem for encrypted fs at %s\n",
+                        fstab[i].mnt_point);
+                goto out;
+            }
+            encrypted = 1;
+        } else {
+            ERROR("Cannot mount filesystem on %s at %s\n",
+                    fstab[i].blk_dev, fstab[i].mnt_point);
+            goto out;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (encrypted) {
+        ret = 1;
+    } else {
+        ret = 0;
+    }
+
+out:
+    free_fstab(fstab);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* If tmp_mnt_point is non-null, mount the filesystem there.  This is for the
+ * tmp mount we do to check the user password
+ */
+int fs_mgr_do_mount(char *fstab_file, char *n_name, char *n_blk_dev, char *tmp_mnt_point)
+{
+    int i = 0;
+    int ret = -1;
+    struct fstab_rec *fstab = 0;
+    char *m;
+
+    if (!(fstab = read_fstab(fstab_file))) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; fstab[i].blk_dev; i++) {
+        if (!fs_match(fstab[i].mnt_point, n_name)) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* We found our match */
+        /* First check the filesystem if requested */
+        if (fstab[i].fs_mgr_flags & MF_WAIT) {
+            wait_for_file(fstab[i].blk_dev, WAIT_TIMEOUT);
+        }
+
+        if (fstab[i].fs_mgr_flags & MF_CHECK) {
+            check_fs(fstab[i].blk_dev, fstab[i].type);
+        }
+
+        /* Now mount it where requested */
+        if (tmp_mnt_point) {
+            m = tmp_mnt_point;
+        } else {
+            m = fstab[i].mnt_point;
+        }
+        if (mount(n_blk_dev, m, fstab[i].type,
+                  fstab[i].flags, fstab[i].fs_options)) {
+            ERROR("Cannot mount filesystem on %s at %s\n",
+                    n_blk_dev, m);
+            goto out;
+        } else {
+            ret = 0;
+            goto out;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* We didn't find a match, say so and return an error */
+    ERROR("Cannot find mount point %s in fstab\n", fstab[i].mnt_point);
+
+out:
+    free_fstab(fstab);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * mount a tmpfs filesystem at the given point.
+ * return 0 on success, non-zero on failure.
+ */
+int fs_mgr_do_tmpfs_mount(char *n_name)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = mount("tmpfs", n_name, "tmpfs",
+                MS_NOATIME | MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV, CRYPTO_TMPFS_OPTIONS);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        ERROR("Cannot mount tmpfs filesystem at %s\n", n_name);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Success */
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int fs_mgr_unmount_all(char *fstab_file)
+{
+    int i = 0;
+    int ret = 0;
+    struct fstab_rec *fstab = 0;
+
+    if (!(fstab = read_fstab(fstab_file))) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    while (fstab[i].blk_dev) {
+        if (umount(fstab[i].mnt_point)) {
+            ERROR("Cannot unmount filesystem at %s\n", fstab[i].mnt_point);
+            ret = -1;
+        }
+        i++;
+    }
+
+    free_fstab(fstab);
+    return ret;
+}
+/*
+ * key_loc must be at least PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX bytes long
+ *
+ * real_blk_dev must be at least PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX bytes long
+ */
+int fs_mgr_get_crypt_info(char *fstab_file, char *key_loc, char *real_blk_dev, int size)
+{
+    int i = 0;
+    struct fstab_rec *fstab = 0;
+
+    if (!(fstab = read_fstab(fstab_file))) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+    /* Initialize return values to null strings */
+    if (key_loc) {
+        *key_loc = '\0';
+    }
+    if (real_blk_dev) {
+        *real_blk_dev = '\0';
+    }
+
+    /* Look for the encryptable partition to find the data */
+    for (i = 0; fstab[i].blk_dev; i++) {
+        if (!(fstab[i].fs_mgr_flags & MF_CRYPT)) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* We found a match */
+        if (key_loc) {
+            strlcpy(key_loc, fstab[i].key_loc, size);
+        }
+        if (real_blk_dev) {
+            strlcpy(real_blk_dev, fstab[i].blk_dev, size);
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+
+    free_fstab(fstab);
+    return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/fs_mgr/fs_mgr_main.c b/crypto/fs_mgr/fs_mgr_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..81febf124
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/fs_mgr/fs_mgr_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include "fs_mgr_priv.h"
+
+char *me = "";
+
+static void usage(void)
+{
+    ERROR("%s: usage: %s <-a | -n mnt_point blk_dev | -u> <fstab_file>\n", me, me);
+    exit(1);
+}
+
+/* Parse the command line.  If an error is encountered, print an error message
+ * and exit the program, do not return to the caller.
+ * Return the number of argv[] entries consumed.
+ */
+static void parse_options(int argc, char *argv[], int *a_flag, int *u_flag, int *n_flag,
+                     char **n_name, char **n_blk_dev)
+{
+    me = basename(strdup(argv[0]));
+
+    if (argc <= 1) {
+        usage();
+    }
+
+    if (!strcmp(argv[1], "-a")) {
+        if (argc != 3) {
+            usage();
+        }
+        *a_flag = 1;
+    }
+    if (!strcmp(argv[1], "-n")) {
+        if (argc != 5) {
+            usage();
+        }
+        *n_flag = 1;
+        *n_name = argv[2];
+        *n_blk_dev = argv[3];
+    }
+    if (!strcmp(argv[1], "-u")) {
+        if (argc != 3) {
+            usage();
+        }
+        *u_flag = 1;
+    }
+
+    /* If no flag is specified, it's an error */
+    if (!(*a_flag | *n_flag | *u_flag)) {
+        usage();
+    }
+
+    /* If more than one flag is specified, it's an error */
+    if ((*a_flag + *n_flag + *u_flag) > 1) {
+        usage();
+    }
+
+    return;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    int a_flag=0;
+    int u_flag=0;
+    int n_flag=0;
+    char *n_name;
+    char *n_blk_dev;
+    char *fstab;
+
+    klog_init();
+    klog_set_level(6);
+
+    parse_options(argc, argv, &a_flag, &u_flag, &n_flag, &n_name, &n_blk_dev);
+
+    /* The name of the fstab file is last, after the option */
+    fstab = argv[argc - 1];
+
+    if (a_flag) {
+        return fs_mgr_mount_all(fstab);
+    } else if (n_flag) {
+        return fs_mgr_do_mount(fstab, n_name, n_blk_dev, 0);
+    } else if (u_flag) {
+        return fs_mgr_unmount_all(fstab);
+    } else {
+        ERROR("%s: Internal error, unknown option\n", me);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
+    /* Should not get here */
+    exit(1);
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/fs_mgr/fs_mgr_priv.h b/crypto/fs_mgr/fs_mgr_priv.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..175fdabd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/fs_mgr/fs_mgr_priv.h
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __CORE_FS_MGR_PRIV_H
+#define __CORE_FS_MGR_PRIV_H
+
+#include <cutils/klog.h>
+#include <fs_mgr.h>
+
+#define INFO(x...)    KLOG_INFO("fs_mgr", x)
+#define ERROR(x...)   KLOG_ERROR("fs_mgr", x)
+
+#define CRYPTO_TMPFS_OPTIONS "size=128m,mode=0771,uid=1000,gid=1000"
+
+struct fstab_rec {
+    char *blk_dev;
+    char *mnt_point;
+    char *type;
+    unsigned long flags;
+    char *fs_options;
+    int fs_mgr_flags;
+    char *key_loc;
+};
+
+#define WAIT_TIMEOUT 5
+
+/* fstab has the following format:
+ *
+ * Any line starting with a # is a comment and ignored
+ *
+ * Any blank line is ignored
+ *
+ * All other lines must be in this format:
+ *   <source>  <mount_point> <fs_type> <mount_flags> <fs_options> <fs_mgr_options>
+ *
+ *   <mount_flags> is a comma separated list of flags that can be passed to the
+ *                 mount command.  The list includes noatime, nosuid, nodev, nodiratime,
+ *                 ro, rw, remount, defaults.
+ *
+ *   <fs_options> is a comma separated list of options accepted by the filesystem being
+ *                mounted.  It is passed directly to mount without being parsed
+ *
+ *   <fs_mgr_options> is a comma separated list of flags that control the operation of
+ *                     the fs_mgr program.  The list includes "wait", which will wait till
+ *                     the <source> file exists, and "check", which requests that the fs_mgr 
+ *                     run an fscheck program on the <source> before mounting the filesystem.
+ *                     If check is specifed on a read-only filesystem, it is ignored.
+ *                     Also, "encryptable" means that filesystem can be encrypted.
+ *                     The "encryptable" flag _MUST_ be followed by a : and a string which
+ *                     is the location of the encryption keys.  I can either be a path
+ *                     to a file or partition which contains the keys, or the word "footer"
+ *                     which means the keys are in the last 16 Kbytes of the partition
+ *                     containing the filesystem.
+ *
+ * When the fs_mgr is requested to mount all filesystems, it will first mount all the
+ * filesystems that do _NOT_ specify check (including filesystems that are read-only and
+ * specify check, because check is ignored in that case) and then it will check and mount
+ * filesystem marked with check.
+ *
+ */
+
+#define MF_WAIT      0x1
+#define MF_CHECK     0x2
+#define MF_CRYPT     0x4
+
+#endif /* __CORE_FS_MGR_PRIV_H */
+
diff --git a/crypto/fs_mgr/include/fs_mgr.h b/crypto/fs_mgr/include/fs_mgr.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..76abb8332
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/fs_mgr/include/fs_mgr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __CORE_FS_MGR_H
+#define __CORE_FS_MGR_H
+
+int fs_mgr_mount_all(char *fstab_file);
+int fs_mgr_do_mount(char *fstab_file, char *n_name, char *n_blk_dev, char *tmp_mnt_point);
+int fs_mgr_do_tmpfs_mount(char *n_name);
+int fs_mgr_unmount_all(char *fstab_file);
+int fs_mgr_get_crypt_info(char *fstab_file, char *key_loc, char *real_blk_dev, int size);
+
+#endif /* __CORE_FS_MGR_H */
+
diff --git a/crypto/ics/cryptfs.c b/crypto/ics/cryptfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..054036628
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/ics/cryptfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1164 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+/* TO DO:
+ *   1.  Perhaps keep several copies of the encrypted key, in case something
+ *       goes horribly wrong?
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <linux/dm-ioctl.h>
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <cutils/android_reboot.h>
+#include <ext4.h>
+#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
+#include "cryptfs.h"
+#define LOG_TAG "Cryptfs"
+#include "cutils/log.h"
+#include "cutils/properties.h"
+#include "hardware_legacy/power.h"
+//#include "VolumeManager.h"
+
+#define DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE 4096
+#define DATA_MNT_POINT "/data"
+
+#define HASH_COUNT 2000
+#define KEY_LEN_BYTES 16
+#define IV_LEN_BYTES 16
+
+#define KEY_LOC_PROP   "ro.crypto.keyfile.userdata"
+#define KEY_IN_FOOTER  "footer"
+
+#define EXT4_FS 1
+#define FAT_FS 2
+
+char *me = "cryptfs";
+
+static unsigned char saved_master_key[KEY_LEN_BYTES];
+static char *saved_data_blkdev;
+static char *saved_mount_point;
+static int  master_key_saved = 0;
+
+static void ioctl_init(struct dm_ioctl *io, size_t dataSize, const char *name, unsigned flags)
+{
+    memset(io, 0, dataSize);
+    io->data_size = dataSize;
+    io->data_start = sizeof(struct dm_ioctl);
+    io->version[0] = 4;
+    io->version[1] = 0;
+    io->version[2] = 0;
+    io->flags = flags;
+    if (name) {
+        strncpy(io->name, name, sizeof(io->name));
+    }
+}
+
+static unsigned int get_fs_size(char *dev)
+{
+    int fd, block_size;
+    struct ext4_super_block sb;
+    off64_t len;
+
+    if ((fd = open(dev, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+        SLOGE("Cannot open device to get filesystem size ");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (lseek64(fd, 1024, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+        SLOGE("Cannot seek to superblock");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (read(fd, &sb, sizeof(sb)) != sizeof(sb)) {
+        SLOGE("Cannot read superblock");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    close(fd);
+
+    block_size = 1024 << sb.s_log_block_size;
+    /* compute length in bytes */
+    len = ( ((off64_t)sb.s_blocks_count_hi << 32) + sb.s_blocks_count_lo) * block_size;
+
+    /* return length in sectors */
+    return (unsigned int) (len / 512);
+}
+
+static unsigned int get_blkdev_size(int fd)
+{
+  unsigned int nr_sec;
+
+  if ( (ioctl(fd, BLKGETSIZE, &nr_sec)) == -1) {
+    nr_sec = 0;
+  }
+
+  return nr_sec;
+}
+
+/* key or salt can be NULL, in which case just skip writing that value.  Useful to
+ * update the failed mount count but not change the key.
+ */
+static int put_crypt_ftr_and_key(char *real_blk_name, struct crypt_mnt_ftr *crypt_ftr,
+                                  unsigned char *key, unsigned char *salt)
+{
+  int fd;
+  unsigned int nr_sec, cnt;
+  off64_t off;
+  int rc = -1;
+  char *fname;
+  char key_loc[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+  struct stat statbuf;
+
+  property_get(KEY_LOC_PROP, key_loc, KEY_IN_FOOTER);
+
+  if (!strcmp(key_loc, KEY_IN_FOOTER)) {
+    fname = real_blk_name;
+    if ( (fd = open(fname, O_RDWR)) < 0) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot open real block device %s\n", fname);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ( (nr_sec = get_blkdev_size(fd)) == 0) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot get size of block device %s\n", fname);
+      goto errout;
+    }
+
+    /* If it's an encrypted Android partition, the last 16 Kbytes contain the
+     * encryption info footer and key, and plenty of bytes to spare for future
+     * growth.
+     */
+    off = ((off64_t)nr_sec * 512) - CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET;
+
+    if (lseek64(fd, off, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot seek to real block device footer\n");
+      goto errout;
+    }
+  } else if (key_loc[0] == '/') {
+    fname = key_loc;
+    if ( (fd = open(fname, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600)) < 0) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot open footer file %s\n", fname);
+      return -1;
+    }
+  } else {
+    SLOGE("Unexpected value for" KEY_LOC_PROP "\n");
+    return -1;;
+  }
+
+  if ((cnt = write(fd, crypt_ftr, sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr))) != sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr)) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot write real block device footer\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if (key) {
+    if (crypt_ftr->keysize != KEY_LEN_BYTES) {
+      SLOGE("Keysize of %d bits not supported for real block device %s\n",
+            crypt_ftr->keysize*8, fname);
+      goto errout; 
+    }
+
+    if ( (cnt = write(fd, key, crypt_ftr->keysize)) != crypt_ftr->keysize) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot write key for real block device %s\n", fname);
+      goto errout;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (salt) {
+    /* Compute the offset from the last write to the salt */
+    off = KEY_TO_SALT_PADDING;
+    if (! key)
+      off += crypt_ftr->keysize;
+
+    if (lseek64(fd, off, SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot seek to real block device salt \n");
+      goto errout;
+    }
+
+    if ( (cnt = write(fd, salt, SALT_LEN)) != SALT_LEN) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot write salt for real block device %s\n", fname);
+      goto errout;
+    }
+  }
+
+  fstat(fd, &statbuf);
+  /* If the keys are kept on a raw block device, do not try to truncate it. */
+  if (S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode) && (key_loc[0] == '/')) {
+    if (ftruncate(fd, 0x4000)) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot set footer file size\n", fname);
+      goto errout;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Success! */
+  rc = 0;
+
+errout:
+  close(fd);
+  return rc;
+
+}
+
+static int get_crypt_ftr_and_key(char *real_blk_name, struct crypt_mnt_ftr *crypt_ftr,
+                                  unsigned char *key, unsigned char *salt)
+{
+  int fd;
+  unsigned int nr_sec, cnt;
+  off64_t off;
+  int rc = -1;
+  char key_loc[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+  char *fname;
+  struct stat statbuf;
+
+  property_get(KEY_LOC_PROP, key_loc, KEY_IN_FOOTER);
+
+  if (!strcmp(key_loc, KEY_IN_FOOTER)) {
+    fname = real_blk_name;
+    if ( (fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+      ui_print("Cannot open real block device %s\n", fname);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ( (nr_sec = get_blkdev_size(fd)) == 0) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot get size of block device %s\n", fname);
+      goto errout;
+    }
+
+    /* If it's an encrypted Android partition, the last 16 Kbytes contain the
+     * encryption info footer and key, and plenty of bytes to spare for future
+     * growth.
+     */
+    off = ((off64_t)nr_sec * 512) - CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET;
+
+    if (lseek64(fd, off, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
+      ui_print("Cannot seek to real block device footer\n");
+      goto errout;
+    }
+  } else if (key_loc[0] == '/') {
+    fname = key_loc;
+    if ( (fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+      ui_print("Cannot open footer file %s\n", fname);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Make sure it's 16 Kbytes in length */
+    fstat(fd, &statbuf);
+    if (S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode) && (statbuf.st_size != 0x4000)) {
+      ui_print("footer file %s is not the expected size!\n", fname);
+      goto errout;
+    }
+  } else {
+    ui_print("Unexpected value for" KEY_LOC_PROP "\n");
+    return -1;;
+  }
+
+  if ( (cnt = read(fd, crypt_ftr, sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr))) != sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr)) {
+    ui_print("Cannot read real block device footer\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if (crypt_ftr->magic != CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC) {
+    ui_print("Bad magic for real block device %s\n", fname);
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if (crypt_ftr->major_version != 1) {
+    ui_print("Cannot understand major version %d real block device footer\n",
+          crypt_ftr->major_version);
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if (crypt_ftr->minor_version != 0) {
+    ui_print("Warning: crypto footer minor version %d, expected 0, continuing...\n",
+          crypt_ftr->minor_version);
+  }
+
+  if (crypt_ftr->ftr_size > sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr)) {
+    /* the footer size is bigger than we expected.
+     * Skip to it's stated end so we can read the key.
+     */
+    if (lseek(fd, crypt_ftr->ftr_size - sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr),  SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
+      ui_print("Cannot seek to start of key\n");
+      goto errout;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (crypt_ftr->keysize != KEY_LEN_BYTES) {
+    ui_print("Keysize of %d bits not supported for real block device %s\n",
+          crypt_ftr->keysize * 8, fname);
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if ( (cnt = read(fd, key, crypt_ftr->keysize)) != crypt_ftr->keysize) {
+    ui_print("Cannot read key for real block device %s\n", fname);
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if (lseek64(fd, KEY_TO_SALT_PADDING, SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
+    ui_print("Cannot seek to real block device salt\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if ( (cnt = read(fd, salt, SALT_LEN)) != SALT_LEN) {
+    ui_print("Cannot read salt for real block device %s\n", fname);
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  /* Success! */
+  rc = 0;
+
+errout:
+  close(fd);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/* Convert a binary key of specified length into an ascii hex string equivalent,
+ * without the leading 0x and with null termination
+ */
+void convert_key_to_hex_ascii(unsigned char *master_key, unsigned int keysize,
+                              char *master_key_ascii)
+{
+  unsigned int i, a;
+  unsigned char nibble;
+
+  for (i=0, a=0; i<keysize; i++, a+=2) {
+    /* For each byte, write out two ascii hex digits */
+    nibble = (master_key[i] >> 4) & 0xf;
+    master_key_ascii[a] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x37 : 0x30);
+
+    nibble = master_key[i] & 0xf;
+    master_key_ascii[a+1] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x37 : 0x30);
+  }
+
+  /* Add the null termination */
+  master_key_ascii[a] = '\0';
+
+}
+
+static int create_crypto_blk_dev(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *crypt_ftr, unsigned char *master_key,
+                                    char *real_blk_name, char *crypto_blk_name, const char *name)
+{
+  char buffer[DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE];
+  char master_key_ascii[129]; /* Large enough to hold 512 bit key and null */
+  char *crypt_params;
+  struct dm_ioctl *io;
+  struct dm_target_spec *tgt;
+  unsigned int minor;
+  int fd;
+  int retval = -1;
+
+  if ((fd = open("/dev/device-mapper", O_RDWR)) < 0 ) {
+    ui_print("Cannot open device-mapper\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  io = (struct dm_ioctl *) buffer;
+
+  ioctl_init(io, DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE, name, 0);
+  if (ioctl(fd, DM_DEV_CREATE, io)) {
+    ui_print("Cannot create dm-crypt device\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  /* Get the device status, in particular, the name of it's device file */
+  ioctl_init(io, DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE, name, 0);
+  if (ioctl(fd, DM_DEV_STATUS, io)) {
+    ui_print("Cannot retrieve dm-crypt device status\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+  minor = (io->dev & 0xff) | ((io->dev >> 12) & 0xfff00);
+  snprintf(crypto_blk_name, MAXPATHLEN, "/dev/block/dm-%u", minor);
+
+  /* Load the mapping table for this device */
+  tgt = (struct dm_target_spec *) &buffer[sizeof(struct dm_ioctl)];
+
+  ioctl_init(io, 4096, name, 0);
+  io->target_count = 1;
+  tgt->status = 0;
+  tgt->sector_start = 0;
+  tgt->length = crypt_ftr->fs_size;
+  strcpy(tgt->target_type, "crypt");
+
+  crypt_params = buffer + sizeof(struct dm_ioctl) + sizeof(struct dm_target_spec);
+  convert_key_to_hex_ascii(master_key, crypt_ftr->keysize, master_key_ascii);
+  sprintf(crypt_params, "%s %s 0 %s 0", crypt_ftr->crypto_type_name,
+          master_key_ascii, real_blk_name);
+  crypt_params += strlen(crypt_params) + 1;
+  crypt_params = (char *) (((unsigned long)crypt_params + 7) & ~8); /* Align to an 8 byte boundary */
+  tgt->next = crypt_params - buffer;
+
+  if (ioctl(fd, DM_TABLE_LOAD, io)) {
+      ui_print("Cannot load dm-crypt mapping table.\n");
+      goto errout;
+  }
+
+  /* Resume this device to activate it */
+  ioctl_init(io, 4096, name, 0);
+
+  if (ioctl(fd, DM_DEV_SUSPEND, io)) {
+    ui_print("Cannot resume the dm-crypt device\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  /* We made it here with no errors.  Woot! */
+  retval = 0;
+
+errout:
+  close(fd);   /* If fd is <0 from a failed open call, it's safe to just ignore the close error */
+
+  return retval;
+}
+
+static int delete_crypto_blk_dev(char *name)
+{
+  int fd;
+  char buffer[DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE];
+  struct dm_ioctl *io;
+  int retval = -1;
+
+  if ((fd = open("/dev/device-mapper", O_RDWR)) < 0 ) {
+    ui_print("Cannot open device-mapper\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  io = (struct dm_ioctl *) buffer;
+
+  ioctl_init(io, DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE, name, 0);
+  if (ioctl(fd, DM_DEV_REMOVE, io)) {
+    ui_print("Cannot remove dm-crypt device\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  /* We made it here with no errors.  Woot! */
+  retval = 0;
+
+errout:
+  close(fd);    /* If fd is <0 from a failed open call, it's safe to just ignore the close error */
+
+  return retval;
+
+}
+
+static void pbkdf2(char *passwd, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *ikey)
+{
+    /* Turn the password into a key and IV that can decrypt the master key */
+    PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(passwd, strlen(passwd), salt, SALT_LEN,
+                           HASH_COUNT, KEY_LEN_BYTES+IV_LEN_BYTES, ikey);
+}
+
+static int encrypt_master_key(char *passwd, unsigned char *salt,
+                              unsigned char *decrypted_master_key,
+                              unsigned char *encrypted_master_key)
+{
+    unsigned char ikey[32+32] = { 0 }; /* Big enough to hold a 256 bit key and 256 bit IV */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX e_ctx;
+    int encrypted_len, final_len;
+
+    /* Turn the password into a key and IV that can decrypt the master key */
+    pbkdf2(passwd, salt, ikey);
+  
+    /* Initialize the decryption engine */
+    if (! EVP_EncryptInit(&e_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), ikey, ikey+KEY_LEN_BYTES)) {
+        SLOGE("EVP_EncryptInit failed\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&e_ctx, 0); /* Turn off padding as our data is block aligned */
+
+    /* Encrypt the master key */
+    if (! EVP_EncryptUpdate(&e_ctx, encrypted_master_key, &encrypted_len,
+                              decrypted_master_key, KEY_LEN_BYTES)) {
+        SLOGE("EVP_EncryptUpdate failed\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (! EVP_EncryptFinal(&e_ctx, encrypted_master_key + encrypted_len, &final_len)) {
+        SLOGE("EVP_EncryptFinal failed\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (encrypted_len + final_len != KEY_LEN_BYTES) {
+        SLOGE("EVP_Encryption length check failed with %d, %d bytes\n", encrypted_len, final_len);
+        return -1;
+    } else {
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+static int decrypt_master_key(char *passwd, unsigned char *salt,
+                              unsigned char *encrypted_master_key,
+                              unsigned char *decrypted_master_key)
+{
+  unsigned char ikey[32+32] = { 0 }; /* Big enough to hold a 256 bit key and 256 bit IV */
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX d_ctx;
+  int decrypted_len, final_len;
+
+  /* Turn the password into a key and IV that can decrypt the master key */
+  pbkdf2(passwd, salt, ikey);
+
+  /* Initialize the decryption engine */
+  if (! EVP_DecryptInit(&d_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), ikey, ikey+KEY_LEN_BYTES)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&d_ctx, 0); /* Turn off padding as our data is block aligned */
+  /* Decrypt the master key */
+  if (! EVP_DecryptUpdate(&d_ctx, decrypted_master_key, &decrypted_len,
+                            encrypted_master_key, KEY_LEN_BYTES)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (! EVP_DecryptFinal(&d_ctx, decrypted_master_key + decrypted_len, &final_len)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (decrypted_len + final_len != KEY_LEN_BYTES) {
+    return -1;
+  } else {
+    return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+static int create_encrypted_random_key(char *passwd, unsigned char *master_key, unsigned char *salt)
+{
+    int fd;
+    unsigned char key_buf[KEY_LEN_BYTES];
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX e_ctx;
+    int encrypted_len, final_len;
+
+    /* Get some random bits for a key */
+    fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+    read(fd, key_buf, sizeof(key_buf));
+    read(fd, salt, SALT_LEN);
+    close(fd);
+
+    /* Now encrypt it with the password */
+    return encrypt_master_key(passwd, salt, key_buf, master_key);
+}
+
+static int get_orig_mount_parms(char *mount_point, char *fs_type, char *real_blkdev,
+                                unsigned long *mnt_flags, char *fs_options)
+{
+  char mount_point2[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+  char fs_flags[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+
+  property_get("ro.crypto.fs_type", fs_type, "");
+  property_get("ro.crypto.fs_real_blkdev", real_blkdev, "");
+  property_get("ro.crypto.fs_mnt_point", mount_point2, "");
+  property_get("ro.crypto.fs_options", fs_options, "");
+  property_get("ro.crypto.fs_flags", fs_flags, "");
+  *mnt_flags = strtol(fs_flags, 0, 0);
+
+  if (strcmp(mount_point, mount_point2)) {
+    /* Consistency check.  These should match. If not, something odd happened. */
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int wait_and_unmount(char *mountpoint)
+{
+    int i, rc;
+#define WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT 20
+
+    /*  Now umount the tmpfs filesystem */
+    for (i=0; i<WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT; i++) {
+        if (umount(mountpoint)) {
+            if (errno == EINVAL) {
+                /* EINVAL is returned if the directory is not a mountpoint,
+                 * i.e. there is no filesystem mounted there.  So just get out.
+                 */
+                break;
+            }
+            sleep(1);
+            i++;
+        } else {
+          break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (i < WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT) {
+      SLOGD("unmounting %s succeeded\n", mountpoint);
+      rc = 0;
+    } else {
+      SLOGE("unmounting %s failed\n", mountpoint);
+      rc = -1;
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+#define DATA_PREP_TIMEOUT 100
+static int prep_data_fs(void)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    /* Do the prep of the /data filesystem */
+    property_set("vold.post_fs_data_done", "0");
+    property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_post_fs_data");
+    SLOGD("Just triggered post_fs_data\n");
+
+    /* Wait a max of 25 seconds, hopefully it takes much less */
+    for (i=0; i<DATA_PREP_TIMEOUT; i++) {
+        char p[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+
+        property_get("vold.post_fs_data_done", p, "0");
+        if (*p == '1') {
+            break;
+        } else {
+            usleep(250000);
+        }
+    }
+    if (i == DATA_PREP_TIMEOUT) {
+        /* Ugh, we failed to prep /data in time.  Bail. */
+        return -1;
+    } else {
+        SLOGD("post_fs_data done\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+int cryptfs_restart(void)
+{
+    char fs_type[32];
+    char real_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+    char crypto_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+    char fs_options[256];
+    unsigned long mnt_flags;
+    struct stat statbuf;
+    int rc = -1, i;
+    static int restart_successful = 0;
+
+    /* Validate that it's OK to call this routine */
+    if (! master_key_saved) {
+        SLOGE("Encrypted filesystem not validated, aborting");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (restart_successful) {
+        SLOGE("System already restarted with encrypted disk, aborting");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Here is where we shut down the framework.  The init scripts
+     * start all services in one of three classes: core, main or late_start.
+     * On boot, we start core and main.  Now, we stop main, but not core,
+     * as core includes vold and a few other really important things that
+     * we need to keep running.  Once main has stopped, we should be able
+     * to umount the tmpfs /data, then mount the encrypted /data.
+     * We then restart the class main, and also the class late_start.
+     * At the moment, I've only put a few things in late_start that I know
+     * are not needed to bring up the framework, and that also cause problems
+     * with unmounting the tmpfs /data, but I hope to add add more services
+     * to the late_start class as we optimize this to decrease the delay
+     * till the user is asked for the password to the filesystem.
+     */
+
+    /* The init files are setup to stop the class main when vold.decrypt is
+     * set to trigger_reset_main.
+     */
+    property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_reset_main");
+    SLOGD("Just asked init to shut down class main\n");
+
+    /* Now that the framework is shutdown, we should be able to umount()
+     * the tmpfs filesystem, and mount the real one.
+     */
+
+    property_get("ro.crypto.fs_crypto_blkdev", crypto_blkdev, "");
+    if (strlen(crypto_blkdev) == 0) {
+        SLOGE("fs_crypto_blkdev not set\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (! get_orig_mount_parms(DATA_MNT_POINT, fs_type, real_blkdev, &mnt_flags, fs_options)) {
+        SLOGD("Just got orig mount parms\n");
+
+        if (! (rc = wait_and_unmount(DATA_MNT_POINT)) ) {
+            /* If that succeeded, then mount the decrypted filesystem */
+            mount(crypto_blkdev, DATA_MNT_POINT, fs_type, mnt_flags, fs_options);
+
+            property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_load_persist_props");
+            /* Create necessary paths on /data */
+            if (prep_data_fs()) {
+                return -1;
+            }
+
+            /* startup service classes main and late_start */
+            property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_framework");
+            SLOGD("Just triggered restart_framework\n");
+
+            /* Give it a few moments to get started */
+            sleep(1);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (rc == 0) {
+        restart_successful = 1;
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static int do_crypto_complete(char *mount_point)
+{
+  struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+  unsigned char encrypted_master_key[32];
+  unsigned char salt[SALT_LEN];
+  char real_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+  char fs_type[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+  char fs_options[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+  unsigned long mnt_flags;
+  char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+
+  property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
+  if (strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted") ) {
+    SLOGE("not running with encryption, aborting");
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (get_orig_mount_parms(mount_point, fs_type, real_blkdev, &mnt_flags, fs_options)) {
+    SLOGE("Error reading original mount parms for mount point %s\n", mount_point);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(real_blkdev, &crypt_ftr, encrypted_master_key, salt)) {
+    SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key\n");
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS) {
+    SLOGE("Encryption process didn't finish successfully\n");
+    return -2;  /* -2 is the clue to the UI that there is no usable data on the disk,
+                 * and give the user an option to wipe the disk */
+  }
+
+  /* We passed the test! We shall diminish, and return to the west */
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_mount_encrypted_fs(char *passwd, char *mount_point, char *label)
+{
+  struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+  /* Allocate enough space for a 256 bit key, but we may use less */
+  unsigned char encrypted_master_key[32], decrypted_master_key[32];
+  unsigned char salt[SALT_LEN];
+  char crypto_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+  char real_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+  char fs_type[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+  char fs_options[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+  char tmp_mount_point[64];
+  unsigned long mnt_flags;
+  unsigned int orig_failed_decrypt_count;
+  char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+  int rc;
+
+  property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
+  if ( master_key_saved || strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted") ) {
+    ui_print("encrypted fs already validated or not running with encryption, aborting");
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (get_orig_mount_parms(mount_point, fs_type, real_blkdev, &mnt_flags, fs_options)) {
+    ui_print("Error reading original mount parms for mount point %s\n", mount_point);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(real_blkdev, &crypt_ftr, encrypted_master_key, salt)) {
+    ui_print("Error getting crypt footer and key\n");
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  ui_print("crypt_ftr->fs_size = %lld\n", crypt_ftr.fs_size);
+  orig_failed_decrypt_count = crypt_ftr.failed_decrypt_count;
+
+  if (! (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED) ) {
+    decrypt_master_key(passwd, salt, encrypted_master_key, decrypted_master_key);
+  }
+
+  if (create_crypto_blk_dev(&crypt_ftr, decrypted_master_key,
+                               real_blkdev, crypto_blkdev, label)) {
+    ui_print("Error creating decrypted block device\n");
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* If init detects an encrypted filesystme, it writes a file for each such
+   * encrypted fs into the tmpfs /data filesystem, and then the framework finds those
+   * files and passes that data to me */
+  /* Create a tmp mount point to try mounting the decryptd fs
+   * Since we're here, the mount_point should be a tmpfs filesystem, so make
+   * a directory in it to test mount the decrypted filesystem.
+   */
+  sprintf(tmp_mount_point, "%s/tmp_mnt", mount_point);
+  mkdir(tmp_mount_point, 0755);
+  if ( mount(crypto_blkdev, tmp_mount_point, "ext4", MS_RDONLY, "") ) {
+    ui_print("Error temp mounting decrypted block device\n");
+    delete_crypto_blk_dev(label);
+    crypt_ftr.failed_decrypt_count++;
+  } else {
+    /* Success, so just umount and we'll mount it properly when we restart
+     * the framework.
+     */
+    umount(tmp_mount_point);
+    crypt_ftr.failed_decrypt_count  = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (orig_failed_decrypt_count != crypt_ftr.failed_decrypt_count) {
+    put_crypt_ftr_and_key(real_blkdev, &crypt_ftr, 0, 0);
+  }
+
+  if (crypt_ftr.failed_decrypt_count) {
+    /* We failed to mount the device, so return an error */
+    rc = crypt_ftr.failed_decrypt_count;
+
+  } else {
+    /* Woot!  Success!  Save the name of the crypto block device
+     * so we can mount it when restarting the framework.
+     */
+    property_set("ro.crypto.fs_crypto_blkdev", crypto_blkdev);
+
+    /* Also save a the master key so we can reencrypted the key
+     * the key when we want to change the password on it.
+     */
+    memcpy(saved_master_key, decrypted_master_key, KEY_LEN_BYTES);
+    saved_data_blkdev = strdup(real_blkdev);
+    saved_mount_point = strdup(mount_point);
+    master_key_saved = 1;
+    rc = 0;
+  }
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/* Called by vold when it wants to undo the crypto mapping of a volume it
+ * manages.  This is usually in response to a factory reset, when we want
+ * to undo the crypto mapping so the volume is formatted in the clear.
+ */
+int cryptfs_revert_volume(const char *label)
+{
+    return delete_crypto_blk_dev((char *)label);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called by vold when it's asked to mount an encrypted, nonremovable volume.
+ * Setup a dm-crypt mapping, use the saved master key from
+ * setting up the /data mapping, and return the new device path.
+ */
+int cryptfs_setup_volume(const char *label, int major, int minor,
+                         char *crypto_sys_path, unsigned int max_path,
+                         int *new_major, int *new_minor)
+{
+    char real_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN], crypto_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+    struct crypt_mnt_ftr sd_crypt_ftr;
+    unsigned char key[32], salt[32];
+    struct stat statbuf;
+    int nr_sec, fd;
+
+    sprintf(real_blkdev, "/dev/block/vold/%d:%d", major, minor);
+
+    /* Just want the footer, but gotta get it all */
+    get_crypt_ftr_and_key(saved_data_blkdev, &sd_crypt_ftr, key, salt);
+
+    /* Update the fs_size field to be the size of the volume */
+    fd = open(real_blkdev, O_RDONLY);
+    nr_sec = get_blkdev_size(fd);
+    close(fd);
+    if (nr_sec == 0) {
+        SLOGE("Cannot get size of volume %s\n", real_blkdev);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    sd_crypt_ftr.fs_size = nr_sec;
+    create_crypto_blk_dev(&sd_crypt_ftr, saved_master_key, real_blkdev, 
+                          crypto_blkdev, label);
+
+    stat(crypto_blkdev, &statbuf);
+    *new_major = MAJOR(statbuf.st_rdev);
+    *new_minor = MINOR(statbuf.st_rdev);
+
+    /* Create path to sys entry for this block device */
+    snprintf(crypto_sys_path, max_path, "/devices/virtual/block/%s", strrchr(crypto_blkdev, '/')+1);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int cryptfs_crypto_complete(void)
+{
+  return do_crypto_complete("/data");
+}
+
+int cryptfs_check_passwd(char *passwd)
+{
+    int rc = -1;
+
+    rc = test_mount_encrypted_fs(passwd, DATA_MNT_POINT, "userdata");
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int cryptfs_verify_passwd(char *passwd)
+{
+    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+    /* Allocate enough space for a 256 bit key, but we may use less */
+    unsigned char encrypted_master_key[32], decrypted_master_key[32];
+    unsigned char salt[SALT_LEN];
+    char real_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+    char fs_type[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+    char fs_options[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+    unsigned long mnt_flags;
+    char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+    int rc;
+
+    property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
+    if (strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted") ) {
+        SLOGE("device not encrypted, aborting");
+        return -2;
+    }
+
+    if (!master_key_saved) {
+        SLOGE("encrypted fs not yet mounted, aborting");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (!saved_mount_point) {
+        SLOGE("encrypted fs failed to save mount point, aborting");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (get_orig_mount_parms(saved_mount_point, fs_type, real_blkdev, &mnt_flags, fs_options)) {
+        SLOGE("Error reading original mount parms for mount point %s\n", saved_mount_point);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(real_blkdev, &crypt_ftr, encrypted_master_key, salt)) {
+        SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED) {
+        /* If the device has no password, then just say the password is valid */
+        rc = 0;
+    } else {
+        decrypt_master_key(passwd, salt, encrypted_master_key, decrypted_master_key);
+        if (!memcmp(decrypted_master_key, saved_master_key, crypt_ftr.keysize)) {
+            /* They match, the password is correct */
+            rc = 0;
+        } else {
+            /* If incorrect, sleep for a bit to prevent dictionary attacks */
+            sleep(1);
+            rc = 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/* Initialize a crypt_mnt_ftr structure.  The keysize is
+ * defaulted to 16 bytes, and the filesystem size to 0.
+ * Presumably, at a minimum, the caller will update the
+ * filesystem size and crypto_type_name after calling this function.
+ */
+static void cryptfs_init_crypt_mnt_ftr(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *ftr)
+{
+    ftr->magic = CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC;
+    ftr->major_version = 1;
+    ftr->minor_version = 0;
+    ftr->ftr_size = sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr);
+    ftr->flags = 0;
+    ftr->keysize = KEY_LEN_BYTES;
+    ftr->spare1 = 0;
+    ftr->fs_size = 0;
+    ftr->failed_decrypt_count = 0;
+    ftr->crypto_type_name[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+static int cryptfs_enable_wipe(char *crypto_blkdev, off64_t size, int type)
+{
+    char cmdline[256];
+    int rc = -1;
+
+    if (type == EXT4_FS) {
+        snprintf(cmdline, sizeof(cmdline), "/system/bin/make_ext4fs -a /data -l %lld %s",
+                 size * 512, crypto_blkdev);
+        SLOGI("Making empty filesystem with command %s\n", cmdline);
+    } else if (type== FAT_FS) {
+        snprintf(cmdline, sizeof(cmdline), "/system/bin/newfs_msdos -F 32 -O android -c 8 -s %lld %s",
+                 size, crypto_blkdev);
+        SLOGI("Making empty filesystem with command %s\n", cmdline);
+    } else {
+        SLOGE("cryptfs_enable_wipe(): unknown filesystem type %d\n", type);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (system(cmdline)) {
+      SLOGE("Error creating empty filesystem on %s\n", crypto_blkdev);
+    } else {
+      SLOGD("Successfully created empty filesystem on %s\n", crypto_blkdev);
+      rc = 0;
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int unix_read(int  fd, void*  buff, int  len)
+{
+    int  ret;
+    do { ret = read(fd, buff, len); } while (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static inline int unix_write(int  fd, const void*  buff, int  len)
+{
+    int  ret;
+    do { ret = write(fd, buff, len); } while (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#define CRYPT_INPLACE_BUFSIZE 4096
+#define CRYPT_SECTORS_PER_BUFSIZE (CRYPT_INPLACE_BUFSIZE / 512)
+static int cryptfs_enable_inplace(char *crypto_blkdev, char *real_blkdev, off64_t size,
+                                  off64_t *size_already_done, off64_t tot_size)
+{
+    int realfd, cryptofd;
+    char *buf[CRYPT_INPLACE_BUFSIZE];
+    int rc = -1;
+    off64_t numblocks, i, remainder;
+    off64_t one_pct, cur_pct, new_pct;
+    off64_t blocks_already_done, tot_numblocks;
+
+    if ( (realfd = open(real_blkdev, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { 
+        SLOGE("Error opening real_blkdev %s for inplace encrypt\n", real_blkdev);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ( (cryptofd = open(crypto_blkdev, O_WRONLY)) < 0) { 
+        SLOGE("Error opening crypto_blkdev %s for inplace encrypt\n", crypto_blkdev);
+        close(realfd);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* This is pretty much a simple loop of reading 4K, and writing 4K.
+     * The size passed in is the number of 512 byte sectors in the filesystem.
+     * So compute the number of whole 4K blocks we should read/write,
+     * and the remainder.
+     */
+    numblocks = size / CRYPT_SECTORS_PER_BUFSIZE;
+    remainder = size % CRYPT_SECTORS_PER_BUFSIZE;
+    tot_numblocks = tot_size / CRYPT_SECTORS_PER_BUFSIZE;
+    blocks_already_done = *size_already_done / CRYPT_SECTORS_PER_BUFSIZE;
+
+    SLOGE("Encrypting filesystem in place...");
+
+    one_pct = tot_numblocks / 100;
+    cur_pct = 0;
+    /* process the majority of the filesystem in blocks */
+    for (i=0; i<numblocks; i++) {
+        new_pct = (i + blocks_already_done) / one_pct;
+        if (new_pct > cur_pct) {
+            char buf[8];
+
+            cur_pct = new_pct;
+            snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%lld", cur_pct);
+            property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", buf);
+        }
+        if (unix_read(realfd, buf, CRYPT_INPLACE_BUFSIZE) <= 0) {
+            SLOGE("Error reading real_blkdev %s for inplace encrypt\n", crypto_blkdev);
+            goto errout;
+        }
+        if (unix_write(cryptofd, buf, CRYPT_INPLACE_BUFSIZE) <= 0) {
+            SLOGE("Error writing crypto_blkdev %s for inplace encrypt\n", crypto_blkdev);
+            goto errout;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Do any remaining sectors */
+    for (i=0; i<remainder; i++) {
+        if (unix_read(realfd, buf, 512) <= 0) {
+            SLOGE("Error reading rival sectors from real_blkdev %s for inplace encrypt\n", crypto_blkdev);
+            goto errout;
+        }
+        if (unix_write(cryptofd, buf, 512) <= 0) {
+            SLOGE("Error writing final sectors to crypto_blkdev %s for inplace encrypt\n", crypto_blkdev);
+            goto errout;
+        }
+    }
+
+    *size_already_done += size;
+    rc = 0;
+
+errout:
+    close(realfd);
+    close(cryptofd);
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+#define CRYPTO_ENABLE_WIPE 1
+#define CRYPTO_ENABLE_INPLACE 2
+
+#define FRAMEWORK_BOOT_WAIT 60
+
+static inline int should_encrypt(struct volume_info *volume)
+{
+    return (volume->flags & (VOL_ENCRYPTABLE | VOL_NONREMOVABLE)) == 
+            (VOL_ENCRYPTABLE | VOL_NONREMOVABLE);
+}
+
+int cryptfs_enable(char *howarg, char *passwd)
+{
+    // Code removed because it needs other parts of vold that aren't needed for decryption
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int cryptfs_changepw(char *newpw)
+{
+    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+    unsigned char encrypted_master_key[KEY_LEN_BYTES], decrypted_master_key[KEY_LEN_BYTES];
+    unsigned char salt[SALT_LEN];
+    char real_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+    /* This is only allowed after we've successfully decrypted the master key */
+    if (! master_key_saved) {
+        SLOGE("Key not saved, aborting");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    property_get("ro.crypto.fs_real_blkdev", real_blkdev, "");
+    if (strlen(real_blkdev) == 0) {
+        SLOGE("Can't find real blkdev");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* get key */
+    if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(real_blkdev, &crypt_ftr, encrypted_master_key, salt)) {
+      SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key");
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+    encrypt_master_key(newpw, salt, saved_master_key, encrypted_master_key);
+
+    /* save the key */
+    put_crypt_ftr_and_key(real_blkdev, &crypt_ftr, encrypted_master_key, salt);
+
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/ics/cryptfs.h b/crypto/ics/cryptfs.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1c1bc1aea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/ics/cryptfs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+/* This structure starts 16,384 bytes before the end of a hardware
+ * partition that is encrypted.
+ * Immediately following this structure is the encrypted key.
+ * The keysize field tells how long the key is, in bytes.
+ * Then there is 32 bytes of padding,
+ * Finally there is the salt used with the user password.
+ * The salt is fixed at 16 bytes long.
+ * Obviously, the filesystem does not include the last 16 kbytes
+ * of the partition.
+ */
+
+#define CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET 0x4000
+
+#define MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN 64
+
+#define SALT_LEN 16
+#define KEY_TO_SALT_PADDING 32
+
+/* definitions of flags in the structure below */
+#define CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED 0x1 /* The key for the partition is not encrypted. */
+#define CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS 0x2 /* Set when starting encryption,
+                                          * clear when done before rebooting */
+
+#define CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC 0xD0B5B1C4
+
+#define __le32 unsigned int
+#define __le16 unsigned short int 
+
+struct crypt_mnt_ftr {
+  __le32 magic;		/* See above */
+  __le16 major_version;
+  __le16 minor_version;
+  __le32 ftr_size; 	/* in bytes, not including key following */
+  __le32 flags;		/* See above */
+  __le32 keysize;	/* in bytes */
+  __le32 spare1;	/* ignored */
+  __le64 fs_size;	/* Size of the encrypted fs, in 512 byte sectors */
+  __le32 failed_decrypt_count; /* count of # of failed attempts to decrypt and
+				  mount, set to 0 on successful mount */
+  unsigned char crypto_type_name[MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN]; /* The type of encryption
+							       needed to decrypt this
+							       partition, null terminated */
+};
+
+struct volume_info {
+   unsigned int size;
+   unsigned int flags;
+   struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+   char mnt_point[256];
+   char blk_dev[256];
+   char crypto_blkdev[256];
+   char label[256];
+};
+#define VOL_NONREMOVABLE 0x1
+#define VOL_ENCRYPTABLE  0x2
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+  int cryptfs_crypto_complete(void);
+  int cryptfs_check_passwd(char *pw);
+  int cryptfs_verify_passwd(char *newpw);
+  int cryptfs_restart(void);
+  int cryptfs_enable(char *flag, char *passwd);
+  int cryptfs_changepw(char *newpw);
+  int cryptfs_setup_volume(const char *label, int major, int minor,
+                           char *crypto_dev_path, unsigned int max_pathlen,
+                           int *new_major, int *new_minor);
+  int cryptfs_revert_volume(const char *label);
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
diff --git a/crypto/jb/cryptfs.c b/crypto/jb/cryptfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..456d49f0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/jb/cryptfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1152 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+/* TO DO:
+ *   1.  Perhaps keep several copies of the encrypted key, in case something
+ *       goes horribly wrong?
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <linux/dm-ioctl.h>
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <cutils/android_reboot.h>
+#include <ext4.h>
+#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
+#include "../fs_mgr/include/fs_mgr.h"
+#include "cryptfs.h"
+#define LOG_TAG "Cryptfs"
+#include "cutils/android_reboot.h"
+#include "cutils/log.h"
+#include "cutils/properties.h"
+#include "hardware_legacy/power.h"
+//#include "VolumeManager.h"
+
+#define DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE 4096
+#define DATA_MNT_POINT "/data"
+
+#define HASH_COUNT 2000
+#define KEY_LEN_BYTES 16
+#define IV_LEN_BYTES 16
+
+#define KEY_IN_FOOTER  "footer"
+
+#define EXT4_FS 1
+#define FAT_FS 2
+
+char *me = "cryptfs";
+
+static unsigned char saved_master_key[KEY_LEN_BYTES];
+static char *saved_data_blkdev;
+static char *saved_mount_point;
+static int  master_key_saved = 0;
+#define FSTAB_PREFIX "/fstab."
+static char fstab_filename[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX + sizeof(FSTAB_PREFIX)];
+
+static void ioctl_init(struct dm_ioctl *io, size_t dataSize, const char *name, unsigned flags)
+{
+    memset(io, 0, dataSize);
+    io->data_size = dataSize;
+    io->data_start = sizeof(struct dm_ioctl);
+    io->version[0] = 4;
+    io->version[1] = 0;
+    io->version[2] = 0;
+    io->flags = flags;
+    if (name) {
+        strncpy(io->name, name, sizeof(io->name));
+    }
+}
+
+static unsigned int get_fs_size(char *dev)
+{
+    int fd, block_size;
+    struct ext4_super_block sb;
+    off64_t len;
+
+    if ((fd = open(dev, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+        SLOGE("Cannot open device to get filesystem size ");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (lseek64(fd, 1024, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+        SLOGE("Cannot seek to superblock");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (read(fd, &sb, sizeof(sb)) != sizeof(sb)) {
+        SLOGE("Cannot read superblock");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    close(fd);
+
+    block_size = 1024 << sb.s_log_block_size;
+    /* compute length in bytes */
+    len = ( ((off64_t)sb.s_blocks_count_hi << 32) + sb.s_blocks_count_lo) * block_size;
+
+    /* return length in sectors */
+    return (unsigned int) (len / 512);
+}
+
+static unsigned int get_blkdev_size(int fd)
+{
+  unsigned int nr_sec;
+
+  if ( (ioctl(fd, BLKGETSIZE, &nr_sec)) == -1) {
+    nr_sec = 0;
+  }
+
+  return nr_sec;
+}
+
+/* Get and cache the name of the fstab file so we don't
+ * keep talking over the socket to the property service.
+ */
+static char *get_fstab_filename(void)
+{
+    if (fstab_filename[0] == 0) {
+        strcpy(fstab_filename, FSTAB_PREFIX);
+        property_get("ro.hardware", fstab_filename + sizeof(FSTAB_PREFIX) - 1, "");
+    }
+
+    return fstab_filename;
+}
+
+/* key or salt can be NULL, in which case just skip writing that value.  Useful to
+ * update the failed mount count but not change the key.
+ */
+static int put_crypt_ftr_and_key(char *real_blk_name, struct crypt_mnt_ftr *crypt_ftr,
+                                  unsigned char *key, unsigned char *salt)
+{
+  int fd;
+  unsigned int nr_sec, cnt;
+  off64_t off;
+  int rc = -1;
+  char *fname;
+  char key_loc[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+  struct stat statbuf;
+
+  fs_mgr_get_crypt_info(get_fstab_filename(), key_loc, 0, sizeof(key_loc));
+
+  if (!strcmp(key_loc, KEY_IN_FOOTER)) {
+    fname = real_blk_name;
+    if ( (fd = open(fname, O_RDWR)) < 0) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot open real block device %s\n", fname);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ( (nr_sec = get_blkdev_size(fd)) == 0) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot get size of block device %s\n", fname);
+      goto errout;
+    }
+
+    /* If it's an encrypted Android partition, the last 16 Kbytes contain the
+     * encryption info footer and key, and plenty of bytes to spare for future
+     * growth.
+     */
+    off = ((off64_t)nr_sec * 512) - CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET;
+
+    if (lseek64(fd, off, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot seek to real block device footer\n");
+      goto errout;
+    }
+  } else if (key_loc[0] == '/') {
+    fname = key_loc;
+    if ( (fd = open(fname, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600)) < 0) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot open footer file %s\n", fname);
+      return -1;
+    }
+  } else {
+    SLOGE("Unexpected value for crypto key location\n");
+    return -1;;
+  }
+
+  if ((cnt = write(fd, crypt_ftr, sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr))) != sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr)) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot write real block device footer\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if (key) {
+    if (crypt_ftr->keysize != KEY_LEN_BYTES) {
+      SLOGE("Keysize of %d bits not supported for real block device %s\n",
+            crypt_ftr->keysize*8, fname);
+      goto errout; 
+    }
+
+    if ( (cnt = write(fd, key, crypt_ftr->keysize)) != crypt_ftr->keysize) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot write key for real block device %s\n", fname);
+      goto errout;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (salt) {
+    /* Compute the offset from the last write to the salt */
+    off = KEY_TO_SALT_PADDING;
+    if (! key)
+      off += crypt_ftr->keysize;
+
+    if (lseek64(fd, off, SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot seek to real block device salt \n");
+      goto errout;
+    }
+
+    if ( (cnt = write(fd, salt, SALT_LEN)) != SALT_LEN) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot write salt for real block device %s\n", fname);
+      goto errout;
+    }
+  }
+
+  fstat(fd, &statbuf);
+  /* If the keys are kept on a raw block device, do not try to truncate it. */
+  if (S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode) && (key_loc[0] == '/')) {
+    if (ftruncate(fd, 0x4000)) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot set footer file size\n", fname);
+      goto errout;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Success! */
+  rc = 0;
+
+errout:
+  close(fd);
+  return rc;
+
+}
+
+static int get_crypt_ftr_and_key(char *real_blk_name, struct crypt_mnt_ftr *crypt_ftr,
+                                  unsigned char *key, unsigned char *salt)
+{
+  int fd;
+  unsigned int nr_sec, cnt;
+  off64_t off;
+  int rc = -1;
+  char key_loc[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+  char *fname;
+  struct stat statbuf;
+
+  fs_mgr_get_crypt_info(get_fstab_filename(), key_loc, 0, sizeof(key_loc));
+
+  if (!strcmp(key_loc, KEY_IN_FOOTER)) {
+    fname = real_blk_name;
+    if ( (fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot open real block device %s\n", fname);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ( (nr_sec = get_blkdev_size(fd)) == 0) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot get size of block device %s\n", fname);
+      goto errout;
+    }
+
+    /* If it's an encrypted Android partition, the last 16 Kbytes contain the
+     * encryption info footer and key, and plenty of bytes to spare for future
+     * growth.
+     */
+    off = ((off64_t)nr_sec * 512) - CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET;
+
+    if (lseek64(fd, off, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot seek to real block device footer\n");
+      goto errout;
+    }
+  } else if (key_loc[0] == '/') {
+    fname = key_loc;
+    if ( (fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot open footer file %s\n", fname);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Make sure it's 16 Kbytes in length */
+    fstat(fd, &statbuf);
+    if (S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode) && (statbuf.st_size != 0x4000)) {
+      SLOGE("footer file %s is not the expected size!\n", fname);
+      goto errout;
+    }
+  } else {
+    SLOGE("Unexpected value for crypto key location\n");
+    return -1;;
+  }
+
+  if ( (cnt = read(fd, crypt_ftr, sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr))) != sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr)) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot read real block device footer\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if (crypt_ftr->magic != CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC) {
+    SLOGE("Bad magic for real block device %s\n", fname);
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if (crypt_ftr->major_version != 1) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot understand major version %d real block device footer\n",
+          crypt_ftr->major_version);
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if (crypt_ftr->minor_version != 0) {
+    SLOGW("Warning: crypto footer minor version %d, expected 0, continuing...\n",
+          crypt_ftr->minor_version);
+  }
+
+  if (crypt_ftr->ftr_size > sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr)) {
+    /* the footer size is bigger than we expected.
+     * Skip to it's stated end so we can read the key.
+     */
+    if (lseek(fd, crypt_ftr->ftr_size - sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr),  SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot seek to start of key\n");
+      goto errout;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (crypt_ftr->keysize != KEY_LEN_BYTES) {
+    SLOGE("Keysize of %d bits not supported for real block device %s\n",
+          crypt_ftr->keysize * 8, fname);
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if ( (cnt = read(fd, key, crypt_ftr->keysize)) != crypt_ftr->keysize) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot read key for real block device %s\n", fname);
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if (lseek64(fd, KEY_TO_SALT_PADDING, SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot seek to real block device salt\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if ( (cnt = read(fd, salt, SALT_LEN)) != SALT_LEN) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot read salt for real block device %s\n", fname);
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  /* Success! */
+  rc = 0;
+
+errout:
+  close(fd);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/* Convert a binary key of specified length into an ascii hex string equivalent,
+ * without the leading 0x and with null termination
+ */
+void convert_key_to_hex_ascii(unsigned char *master_key, unsigned int keysize,
+                              char *master_key_ascii)
+{
+  unsigned int i, a;
+  unsigned char nibble;
+
+  for (i=0, a=0; i<keysize; i++, a+=2) {
+    /* For each byte, write out two ascii hex digits */
+    nibble = (master_key[i] >> 4) & 0xf;
+    master_key_ascii[a] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x37 : 0x30);
+
+    nibble = master_key[i] & 0xf;
+    master_key_ascii[a+1] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x37 : 0x30);
+  }
+
+  /* Add the null termination */
+  master_key_ascii[a] = '\0';
+
+}
+
+static int create_crypto_blk_dev(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *crypt_ftr, unsigned char *master_key,
+                                    char *real_blk_name, char *crypto_blk_name, const char *name)
+{
+  char buffer[DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE];
+  char master_key_ascii[129]; /* Large enough to hold 512 bit key and null */
+  char *crypt_params;
+  struct dm_ioctl *io;
+  struct dm_target_spec *tgt;
+  unsigned int minor;
+  int fd;
+  int retval = -1;
+
+  if ((fd = open("/dev/device-mapper", O_RDWR)) < 0 ) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot open device-mapper\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  io = (struct dm_ioctl *) buffer;
+
+  ioctl_init(io, DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE, name, 0);
+  if (ioctl(fd, DM_DEV_CREATE, io)) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot create dm-crypt device\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  /* Get the device status, in particular, the name of it's device file */
+  ioctl_init(io, DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE, name, 0);
+  if (ioctl(fd, DM_DEV_STATUS, io)) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot retrieve dm-crypt device status\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+  minor = (io->dev & 0xff) | ((io->dev >> 12) & 0xfff00);
+  snprintf(crypto_blk_name, MAXPATHLEN, "/dev/block/dm-%u", minor);
+
+  /* Load the mapping table for this device */
+  tgt = (struct dm_target_spec *) &buffer[sizeof(struct dm_ioctl)];
+
+  ioctl_init(io, 4096, name, 0);
+  io->target_count = 1;
+  tgt->status = 0;
+  tgt->sector_start = 0;
+  tgt->length = crypt_ftr->fs_size;
+  strcpy(tgt->target_type, "crypt");
+
+  crypt_params = buffer + sizeof(struct dm_ioctl) + sizeof(struct dm_target_spec);
+  convert_key_to_hex_ascii(master_key, crypt_ftr->keysize, master_key_ascii);
+  sprintf(crypt_params, "%s %s 0 %s 0", crypt_ftr->crypto_type_name,
+          master_key_ascii, real_blk_name);
+  crypt_params += strlen(crypt_params) + 1;
+  crypt_params = (char *) (((unsigned long)crypt_params + 7) & ~8); /* Align to an 8 byte boundary */
+  tgt->next = crypt_params - buffer;
+
+  if (ioctl(fd, DM_TABLE_LOAD, io)) {
+      SLOGE("Cannot load dm-crypt mapping table.\n");
+      goto errout;
+  }
+
+  /* Resume this device to activate it */
+  ioctl_init(io, 4096, name, 0);
+
+  if (ioctl(fd, DM_DEV_SUSPEND, io)) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot resume the dm-crypt device\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  /* We made it here with no errors.  Woot! */
+  retval = 0;
+
+errout:
+  close(fd);   /* If fd is <0 from a failed open call, it's safe to just ignore the close error */
+
+  return retval;
+}
+
+static int delete_crypto_blk_dev(char *name)
+{
+  int fd;
+  char buffer[DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE];
+  struct dm_ioctl *io;
+  int retval = -1;
+
+  if ((fd = open("/dev/device-mapper", O_RDWR)) < 0 ) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot open device-mapper\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  io = (struct dm_ioctl *) buffer;
+
+  ioctl_init(io, DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE, name, 0);
+  if (ioctl(fd, DM_DEV_REMOVE, io)) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot remove dm-crypt device\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  /* We made it here with no errors.  Woot! */
+  retval = 0;
+
+errout:
+  close(fd);    /* If fd is <0 from a failed open call, it's safe to just ignore the close error */
+
+  return retval;
+
+}
+
+static void pbkdf2(char *passwd, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *ikey)
+{
+    /* Turn the password into a key and IV that can decrypt the master key */
+    PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(passwd, strlen(passwd), salt, SALT_LEN,
+                           HASH_COUNT, KEY_LEN_BYTES+IV_LEN_BYTES, ikey);
+}
+
+static int encrypt_master_key(char *passwd, unsigned char *salt,
+                              unsigned char *decrypted_master_key,
+                              unsigned char *encrypted_master_key)
+{
+    unsigned char ikey[32+32] = { 0 }; /* Big enough to hold a 256 bit key and 256 bit IV */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX e_ctx;
+    int encrypted_len, final_len;
+
+    /* Turn the password into a key and IV that can decrypt the master key */
+    pbkdf2(passwd, salt, ikey);
+  
+    /* Initialize the decryption engine */
+    if (! EVP_EncryptInit(&e_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), ikey, ikey+KEY_LEN_BYTES)) {
+        SLOGE("EVP_EncryptInit failed\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&e_ctx, 0); /* Turn off padding as our data is block aligned */
+
+    /* Encrypt the master key */
+    if (! EVP_EncryptUpdate(&e_ctx, encrypted_master_key, &encrypted_len,
+                              decrypted_master_key, KEY_LEN_BYTES)) {
+        SLOGE("EVP_EncryptUpdate failed\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (! EVP_EncryptFinal(&e_ctx, encrypted_master_key + encrypted_len, &final_len)) {
+        SLOGE("EVP_EncryptFinal failed\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (encrypted_len + final_len != KEY_LEN_BYTES) {
+        SLOGE("EVP_Encryption length check failed with %d, %d bytes\n", encrypted_len, final_len);
+        return -1;
+    } else {
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+static int decrypt_master_key(char *passwd, unsigned char *salt,
+                              unsigned char *encrypted_master_key,
+                              unsigned char *decrypted_master_key)
+{
+  unsigned char ikey[32+32] = { 0 }; /* Big enough to hold a 256 bit key and 256 bit IV */
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX d_ctx;
+  int decrypted_len, final_len;
+
+  /* Turn the password into a key and IV that can decrypt the master key */
+  pbkdf2(passwd, salt, ikey);
+
+  /* Initialize the decryption engine */
+  if (! EVP_DecryptInit(&d_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), ikey, ikey+KEY_LEN_BYTES)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&d_ctx, 0); /* Turn off padding as our data is block aligned */
+  /* Decrypt the master key */
+  if (! EVP_DecryptUpdate(&d_ctx, decrypted_master_key, &decrypted_len,
+                            encrypted_master_key, KEY_LEN_BYTES)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (! EVP_DecryptFinal(&d_ctx, decrypted_master_key + decrypted_len, &final_len)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (decrypted_len + final_len != KEY_LEN_BYTES) {
+    return -1;
+  } else {
+    return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+static int create_encrypted_random_key(char *passwd, unsigned char *master_key, unsigned char *salt)
+{
+    int fd;
+    unsigned char key_buf[KEY_LEN_BYTES];
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX e_ctx;
+    int encrypted_len, final_len;
+
+    /* Get some random bits for a key */
+    fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+    read(fd, key_buf, sizeof(key_buf));
+    read(fd, salt, SALT_LEN);
+    close(fd);
+
+    /* Now encrypt it with the password */
+    return encrypt_master_key(passwd, salt, key_buf, master_key);
+}
+
+static int wait_and_unmount(char *mountpoint)
+{
+    int i, rc;
+#define WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT 20
+
+    /*  Now umount the tmpfs filesystem */
+    for (i=0; i<WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT; i++) {
+        if (umount(mountpoint)) {
+            if (errno == EINVAL) {
+                /* EINVAL is returned if the directory is not a mountpoint,
+                 * i.e. there is no filesystem mounted there.  So just get out.
+                 */
+                break;
+            }
+            sleep(1);
+            i++;
+        } else {
+          break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (i < WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT) {
+      SLOGD("unmounting %s succeeded\n", mountpoint);
+      rc = 0;
+    } else {
+      SLOGE("unmounting %s failed\n", mountpoint);
+      rc = -1;
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+#define DATA_PREP_TIMEOUT 100
+static int prep_data_fs(void)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    /* Do the prep of the /data filesystem */
+    property_set("vold.post_fs_data_done", "0");
+    property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_post_fs_data");
+    SLOGD("Just triggered post_fs_data\n");
+
+    /* Wait a max of 25 seconds, hopefully it takes much less */
+    for (i=0; i<DATA_PREP_TIMEOUT; i++) {
+        char p[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+
+        property_get("vold.post_fs_data_done", p, "0");
+        if (*p == '1') {
+            break;
+        } else {
+            usleep(250000);
+        }
+    }
+    if (i == DATA_PREP_TIMEOUT) {
+        /* Ugh, we failed to prep /data in time.  Bail. */
+        return -1;
+    } else {
+        SLOGD("post_fs_data done\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+int cryptfs_restart(void)
+{
+    char fs_type[32];
+    char real_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+    char crypto_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+    char fs_options[256];
+    unsigned long mnt_flags;
+    struct stat statbuf;
+    int rc = -1, i;
+    static int restart_successful = 0;
+
+    /* Validate that it's OK to call this routine */
+    if (! master_key_saved) {
+        SLOGE("Encrypted filesystem not validated, aborting");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (restart_successful) {
+        SLOGE("System already restarted with encrypted disk, aborting");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Here is where we shut down the framework.  The init scripts
+     * start all services in one of three classes: core, main or late_start.
+     * On boot, we start core and main.  Now, we stop main, but not core,
+     * as core includes vold and a few other really important things that
+     * we need to keep running.  Once main has stopped, we should be able
+     * to umount the tmpfs /data, then mount the encrypted /data.
+     * We then restart the class main, and also the class late_start.
+     * At the moment, I've only put a few things in late_start that I know
+     * are not needed to bring up the framework, and that also cause problems
+     * with unmounting the tmpfs /data, but I hope to add add more services
+     * to the late_start class as we optimize this to decrease the delay
+     * till the user is asked for the password to the filesystem.
+     */
+
+    /* The init files are setup to stop the class main when vold.decrypt is
+     * set to trigger_reset_main.
+     */
+    property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_reset_main");
+    SLOGD("Just asked init to shut down class main\n");
+
+    /* Now that the framework is shutdown, we should be able to umount()
+     * the tmpfs filesystem, and mount the real one.
+     */
+
+    property_get("ro.crypto.fs_crypto_blkdev", crypto_blkdev, "");
+    if (strlen(crypto_blkdev) == 0) {
+        SLOGE("fs_crypto_blkdev not set\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (! (rc = wait_and_unmount(DATA_MNT_POINT)) ) {
+        /* If that succeeded, then mount the decrypted filesystem */
+        fs_mgr_do_mount(get_fstab_filename(), DATA_MNT_POINT, crypto_blkdev, 0);
+
+        property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_load_persist_props");
+        /* Create necessary paths on /data */
+        if (prep_data_fs()) {
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        /* startup service classes main and late_start */
+        property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_framework");
+        SLOGD("Just triggered restart_framework\n");
+
+        /* Give it a few moments to get started */
+        sleep(1);
+    }
+
+    if (rc == 0) {
+        restart_successful = 1;
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static int do_crypto_complete(char *mount_point)
+{
+  struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+  unsigned char encrypted_master_key[32];
+  unsigned char salt[SALT_LEN];
+  char real_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+  char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+  char key_loc[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+
+  property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
+  if (strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted") ) {
+    SLOGE("not running with encryption, aborting");
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  fs_mgr_get_crypt_info(get_fstab_filename(), 0, real_blkdev, sizeof(real_blkdev));
+
+  if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(real_blkdev, &crypt_ftr, encrypted_master_key, salt)) {
+    fs_mgr_get_crypt_info(get_fstab_filename(), key_loc, 0, sizeof(key_loc));
+
+    /*
+     * Only report this error if key_loc is a file and it exists.
+     * If the device was never encrypted, and /data is not mountable for
+     * some reason, returning 1 should prevent the UI from presenting the
+     * a "enter password" screen, or worse, a "press button to wipe the
+     * device" screen.
+     */
+    if ((key_loc[0] == '/') && (access("key_loc", F_OK) == -1)) {
+      SLOGE("master key file does not exist, aborting");
+      return 1;
+    } else {
+      SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key\n");
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS) {
+    SLOGE("Encryption process didn't finish successfully\n");
+    return -2;  /* -2 is the clue to the UI that there is no usable data on the disk,
+                 * and give the user an option to wipe the disk */
+  }
+
+  /* We passed the test! We shall diminish, and return to the west */
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_mount_encrypted_fs(char *passwd, char *mount_point, char *label)
+{
+  struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+  /* Allocate enough space for a 256 bit key, but we may use less */
+  unsigned char encrypted_master_key[32], decrypted_master_key[32];
+  unsigned char salt[SALT_LEN];
+  char crypto_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+  char real_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+  char tmp_mount_point[64];
+  unsigned int orig_failed_decrypt_count;
+  char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+  int rc;
+
+  property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
+  if ( master_key_saved || strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted") ) {
+    SLOGE("encrypted fs already validated or not running with encryption, aborting");
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  fs_mgr_get_crypt_info(get_fstab_filename(), 0, real_blkdev, sizeof(real_blkdev));
+
+  if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(real_blkdev, &crypt_ftr, encrypted_master_key, salt)) {
+    SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key\n");
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  SLOGD("crypt_ftr->fs_size = %lld\n", crypt_ftr.fs_size);
+  orig_failed_decrypt_count = crypt_ftr.failed_decrypt_count;
+
+  if (! (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED) ) {
+    decrypt_master_key(passwd, salt, encrypted_master_key, decrypted_master_key);
+  }
+
+  if (create_crypto_blk_dev(&crypt_ftr, decrypted_master_key,
+                               real_blkdev, crypto_blkdev, label)) {
+    SLOGE("Error creating decrypted block device\n");
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* If init detects an encrypted filesystme, it writes a file for each such
+   * encrypted fs into the tmpfs /data filesystem, and then the framework finds those
+   * files and passes that data to me */
+  /* Create a tmp mount point to try mounting the decryptd fs
+   * Since we're here, the mount_point should be a tmpfs filesystem, so make
+   * a directory in it to test mount the decrypted filesystem.
+   */
+  sprintf(tmp_mount_point, "%s/tmp_mnt", mount_point);
+  mkdir(tmp_mount_point, 0755);
+  if (fs_mgr_do_mount(get_fstab_filename(), DATA_MNT_POINT, crypto_blkdev, tmp_mount_point)) {
+    SLOGE("Error temp mounting decrypted block device\n");
+    delete_crypto_blk_dev(label);
+    crypt_ftr.failed_decrypt_count++;
+  } else {
+    /* Success, so just umount and we'll mount it properly when we restart
+     * the framework.
+     */
+    umount(tmp_mount_point);
+    crypt_ftr.failed_decrypt_count  = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (orig_failed_decrypt_count != crypt_ftr.failed_decrypt_count) {
+    put_crypt_ftr_and_key(real_blkdev, &crypt_ftr, 0, 0);
+  }
+
+  if (crypt_ftr.failed_decrypt_count) {
+    /* We failed to mount the device, so return an error */
+    rc = crypt_ftr.failed_decrypt_count;
+
+  } else {
+    /* Woot!  Success!  Save the name of the crypto block device
+     * so we can mount it when restarting the framework.
+     */
+    property_set("ro.crypto.fs_crypto_blkdev", crypto_blkdev);
+
+    /* Also save a the master key so we can reencrypted the key
+     * the key when we want to change the password on it.
+     */
+    memcpy(saved_master_key, decrypted_master_key, KEY_LEN_BYTES);
+    saved_data_blkdev = strdup(real_blkdev);
+    saved_mount_point = strdup(mount_point);
+    master_key_saved = 1;
+    rc = 0;
+  }
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/* Called by vold when it wants to undo the crypto mapping of a volume it
+ * manages.  This is usually in response to a factory reset, when we want
+ * to undo the crypto mapping so the volume is formatted in the clear.
+ */
+int cryptfs_revert_volume(const char *label)
+{
+    return delete_crypto_blk_dev((char *)label);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called by vold when it's asked to mount an encrypted, nonremovable volume.
+ * Setup a dm-crypt mapping, use the saved master key from
+ * setting up the /data mapping, and return the new device path.
+ */
+int cryptfs_setup_volume(const char *label, int major, int minor,
+                         char *crypto_sys_path, unsigned int max_path,
+                         int *new_major, int *new_minor)
+{
+    char real_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN], crypto_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+    struct crypt_mnt_ftr sd_crypt_ftr;
+    unsigned char key[32], salt[32];
+    struct stat statbuf;
+    int nr_sec, fd;
+
+    sprintf(real_blkdev, "/dev/block/vold/%d:%d", major, minor);
+
+    /* Just want the footer, but gotta get it all */
+    get_crypt_ftr_and_key(saved_data_blkdev, &sd_crypt_ftr, key, salt);
+
+    /* Update the fs_size field to be the size of the volume */
+    fd = open(real_blkdev, O_RDONLY);
+    nr_sec = get_blkdev_size(fd);
+    close(fd);
+    if (nr_sec == 0) {
+        SLOGE("Cannot get size of volume %s\n", real_blkdev);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    sd_crypt_ftr.fs_size = nr_sec;
+    create_crypto_blk_dev(&sd_crypt_ftr, saved_master_key, real_blkdev, 
+                          crypto_blkdev, label);
+
+    stat(crypto_blkdev, &statbuf);
+    *new_major = MAJOR(statbuf.st_rdev);
+    *new_minor = MINOR(statbuf.st_rdev);
+
+    /* Create path to sys entry for this block device */
+    snprintf(crypto_sys_path, max_path, "/devices/virtual/block/%s", strrchr(crypto_blkdev, '/')+1);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int cryptfs_crypto_complete(void)
+{
+  return do_crypto_complete("/data");
+}
+
+int cryptfs_check_passwd(char *passwd)
+{
+    int rc = -1;
+
+    rc = test_mount_encrypted_fs(passwd, DATA_MNT_POINT, "userdata");
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int cryptfs_verify_passwd(char *passwd)
+{
+    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+    /* Allocate enough space for a 256 bit key, but we may use less */
+    unsigned char encrypted_master_key[32], decrypted_master_key[32];
+    unsigned char salt[SALT_LEN];
+    char real_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+    char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+    int rc;
+
+    property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
+    if (strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted") ) {
+        SLOGE("device not encrypted, aborting");
+        return -2;
+    }
+
+    if (!master_key_saved) {
+        SLOGE("encrypted fs not yet mounted, aborting");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (!saved_mount_point) {
+        SLOGE("encrypted fs failed to save mount point, aborting");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    fs_mgr_get_crypt_info(get_fstab_filename(), 0, real_blkdev, sizeof(real_blkdev));
+
+    if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(real_blkdev, &crypt_ftr, encrypted_master_key, salt)) {
+        SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED) {
+        /* If the device has no password, then just say the password is valid */
+        rc = 0;
+    } else {
+        decrypt_master_key(passwd, salt, encrypted_master_key, decrypted_master_key);
+        if (!memcmp(decrypted_master_key, saved_master_key, crypt_ftr.keysize)) {
+            /* They match, the password is correct */
+            rc = 0;
+        } else {
+            /* If incorrect, sleep for a bit to prevent dictionary attacks */
+            sleep(1);
+            rc = 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/* Initialize a crypt_mnt_ftr structure.  The keysize is
+ * defaulted to 16 bytes, and the filesystem size to 0.
+ * Presumably, at a minimum, the caller will update the
+ * filesystem size and crypto_type_name after calling this function.
+ */
+static void cryptfs_init_crypt_mnt_ftr(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *ftr)
+{
+    ftr->magic = CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC;
+    ftr->major_version = 1;
+    ftr->minor_version = 0;
+    ftr->ftr_size = sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr);
+    ftr->flags = 0;
+    ftr->keysize = KEY_LEN_BYTES;
+    ftr->spare1 = 0;
+    ftr->fs_size = 0;
+    ftr->failed_decrypt_count = 0;
+    ftr->crypto_type_name[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+static int cryptfs_enable_wipe(char *crypto_blkdev, off64_t size, int type)
+{
+    char cmdline[256];
+    int rc = -1;
+
+    if (type == EXT4_FS) {
+        snprintf(cmdline, sizeof(cmdline), "/system/bin/make_ext4fs -a /data -l %lld %s",
+                 size * 512, crypto_blkdev);
+        SLOGI("Making empty filesystem with command %s\n", cmdline);
+    } else if (type== FAT_FS) {
+        snprintf(cmdline, sizeof(cmdline), "/system/bin/newfs_msdos -F 32 -O android -c 8 -s %lld %s",
+                 size, crypto_blkdev);
+        SLOGI("Making empty filesystem with command %s\n", cmdline);
+    } else {
+        SLOGE("cryptfs_enable_wipe(): unknown filesystem type %d\n", type);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (system(cmdline)) {
+      SLOGE("Error creating empty filesystem on %s\n", crypto_blkdev);
+    } else {
+      SLOGD("Successfully created empty filesystem on %s\n", crypto_blkdev);
+      rc = 0;
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int unix_read(int  fd, void*  buff, int  len)
+{
+    int  ret;
+    do { ret = read(fd, buff, len); } while (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static inline int unix_write(int  fd, const void*  buff, int  len)
+{
+    int  ret;
+    do { ret = write(fd, buff, len); } while (ret < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#define CRYPT_INPLACE_BUFSIZE 4096
+#define CRYPT_SECTORS_PER_BUFSIZE (CRYPT_INPLACE_BUFSIZE / 512)
+static int cryptfs_enable_inplace(char *crypto_blkdev, char *real_blkdev, off64_t size,
+                                  off64_t *size_already_done, off64_t tot_size)
+{
+    int realfd, cryptofd;
+    char *buf[CRYPT_INPLACE_BUFSIZE];
+    int rc = -1;
+    off64_t numblocks, i, remainder;
+    off64_t one_pct, cur_pct, new_pct;
+    off64_t blocks_already_done, tot_numblocks;
+
+    if ( (realfd = open(real_blkdev, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { 
+        SLOGE("Error opening real_blkdev %s for inplace encrypt\n", real_blkdev);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ( (cryptofd = open(crypto_blkdev, O_WRONLY)) < 0) { 
+        SLOGE("Error opening crypto_blkdev %s for inplace encrypt\n", crypto_blkdev);
+        close(realfd);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* This is pretty much a simple loop of reading 4K, and writing 4K.
+     * The size passed in is the number of 512 byte sectors in the filesystem.
+     * So compute the number of whole 4K blocks we should read/write,
+     * and the remainder.
+     */
+    numblocks = size / CRYPT_SECTORS_PER_BUFSIZE;
+    remainder = size % CRYPT_SECTORS_PER_BUFSIZE;
+    tot_numblocks = tot_size / CRYPT_SECTORS_PER_BUFSIZE;
+    blocks_already_done = *size_already_done / CRYPT_SECTORS_PER_BUFSIZE;
+
+    SLOGE("Encrypting filesystem in place...");
+
+    one_pct = tot_numblocks / 100;
+    cur_pct = 0;
+    /* process the majority of the filesystem in blocks */
+    for (i=0; i<numblocks; i++) {
+        new_pct = (i + blocks_already_done) / one_pct;
+        if (new_pct > cur_pct) {
+            char buf[8];
+
+            cur_pct = new_pct;
+            snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%lld", cur_pct);
+            property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", buf);
+        }
+        if (unix_read(realfd, buf, CRYPT_INPLACE_BUFSIZE) <= 0) {
+            SLOGE("Error reading real_blkdev %s for inplace encrypt\n", crypto_blkdev);
+            goto errout;
+        }
+        if (unix_write(cryptofd, buf, CRYPT_INPLACE_BUFSIZE) <= 0) {
+            SLOGE("Error writing crypto_blkdev %s for inplace encrypt\n", crypto_blkdev);
+            goto errout;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Do any remaining sectors */
+    for (i=0; i<remainder; i++) {
+        if (unix_read(realfd, buf, 512) <= 0) {
+            SLOGE("Error reading rival sectors from real_blkdev %s for inplace encrypt\n", crypto_blkdev);
+            goto errout;
+        }
+        if (unix_write(cryptofd, buf, 512) <= 0) {
+            SLOGE("Error writing final sectors to crypto_blkdev %s for inplace encrypt\n", crypto_blkdev);
+            goto errout;
+        }
+    }
+
+    *size_already_done += size;
+    rc = 0;
+
+errout:
+    close(realfd);
+    close(cryptofd);
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+#define CRYPTO_ENABLE_WIPE 1
+#define CRYPTO_ENABLE_INPLACE 2
+
+#define FRAMEWORK_BOOT_WAIT 60
+
+static inline int should_encrypt(struct volume_info *volume)
+{
+    return (volume->flags & (VOL_ENCRYPTABLE | VOL_NONREMOVABLE)) == 
+            (VOL_ENCRYPTABLE | VOL_NONREMOVABLE);
+}
+
+int cryptfs_enable(char *howarg, char *passwd)
+{
+    // Code removed because it needs other parts of vold that aren't needed for decryption
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int cryptfs_changepw(char *newpw)
+{
+    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+    unsigned char encrypted_master_key[KEY_LEN_BYTES], decrypted_master_key[KEY_LEN_BYTES];
+    unsigned char salt[SALT_LEN];
+    char real_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+    /* This is only allowed after we've successfully decrypted the master key */
+    if (! master_key_saved) {
+        SLOGE("Key not saved, aborting");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    fs_mgr_get_crypt_info(get_fstab_filename(), 0, real_blkdev, sizeof(real_blkdev));
+    if (strlen(real_blkdev) == 0) {
+        SLOGE("Can't find real blkdev");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* get key */
+    if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(real_blkdev, &crypt_ftr, encrypted_master_key, salt)) {
+      SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key");
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+    encrypt_master_key(newpw, salt, saved_master_key, encrypted_master_key);
+
+    /* save the key */
+    put_crypt_ftr_and_key(real_blkdev, &crypt_ftr, encrypted_master_key, salt);
+
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/jb/cryptfs.h b/crypto/jb/cryptfs.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1c1bc1aea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/jb/cryptfs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+/* This structure starts 16,384 bytes before the end of a hardware
+ * partition that is encrypted.
+ * Immediately following this structure is the encrypted key.
+ * The keysize field tells how long the key is, in bytes.
+ * Then there is 32 bytes of padding,
+ * Finally there is the salt used with the user password.
+ * The salt is fixed at 16 bytes long.
+ * Obviously, the filesystem does not include the last 16 kbytes
+ * of the partition.
+ */
+
+#define CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET 0x4000
+
+#define MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN 64
+
+#define SALT_LEN 16
+#define KEY_TO_SALT_PADDING 32
+
+/* definitions of flags in the structure below */
+#define CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED 0x1 /* The key for the partition is not encrypted. */
+#define CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS 0x2 /* Set when starting encryption,
+                                          * clear when done before rebooting */
+
+#define CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC 0xD0B5B1C4
+
+#define __le32 unsigned int
+#define __le16 unsigned short int 
+
+struct crypt_mnt_ftr {
+  __le32 magic;		/* See above */
+  __le16 major_version;
+  __le16 minor_version;
+  __le32 ftr_size; 	/* in bytes, not including key following */
+  __le32 flags;		/* See above */
+  __le32 keysize;	/* in bytes */
+  __le32 spare1;	/* ignored */
+  __le64 fs_size;	/* Size of the encrypted fs, in 512 byte sectors */
+  __le32 failed_decrypt_count; /* count of # of failed attempts to decrypt and
+				  mount, set to 0 on successful mount */
+  unsigned char crypto_type_name[MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN]; /* The type of encryption
+							       needed to decrypt this
+							       partition, null terminated */
+};
+
+struct volume_info {
+   unsigned int size;
+   unsigned int flags;
+   struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+   char mnt_point[256];
+   char blk_dev[256];
+   char crypto_blkdev[256];
+   char label[256];
+};
+#define VOL_NONREMOVABLE 0x1
+#define VOL_ENCRYPTABLE  0x2
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+  int cryptfs_crypto_complete(void);
+  int cryptfs_check_passwd(char *pw);
+  int cryptfs_verify_passwd(char *newpw);
+  int cryptfs_restart(void);
+  int cryptfs_enable(char *flag, char *passwd);
+  int cryptfs_changepw(char *newpw);
+  int cryptfs_setup_volume(const char *label, int major, int minor,
+                           char *crypto_dev_path, unsigned int max_pathlen,
+                           int *new_major, int *new_minor);
+  int cryptfs_revert_volume(const char *label);
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+