From bd7492de28963b7e74e8e5d3f17ec9a5a287d9c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ethan Yonker Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 13:55:01 -0600 Subject: Support File Based Encryption Change-Id: Ib688ddd0c32d3999590cacd86b6d9b18eac336e9 --- crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4Crypt.cpp | 521 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 521 insertions(+) create mode 100644 crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4Crypt.cpp (limited to 'crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4Crypt.cpp') diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4Crypt.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4Crypt.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..423147d66 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4Crypt.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,521 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2015 The Android Open Source Project + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "Ext4Crypt.h" +#include "Decrypt.h" + +#include "KeyStorage.h" +#include "Utils.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "ext4_crypt.h" +#include "key_control.h" + +#include +#include "HashPassword.h" + +#define EMULATED_USES_SELINUX 0 +#define MANAGE_MISC_DIRS 0 + +#include + +#include +//#include +#include + +#define LOG(x) std::cout +#define PLOG(x) std::cout +#define DATA_MNT_POINT "/data" + +using android::base::StringPrintf; +using android::vold::kEmptyAuthentication; + +// NOTE: keep in sync with StorageManager +//static constexpr int FLAG_STORAGE_DE = 1 << 0; // moved to Decrypt.h +//static constexpr int FLAG_STORAGE_CE = 1 << 1; + +namespace { +const std::string device_key_dir = std::string() + DATA_MNT_POINT + e4crypt_unencrypted_folder; +const std::string device_key_path = device_key_dir + "/key"; +const std::string device_key_temp = device_key_dir + "/temp"; + +const std::string user_key_dir = std::string() + DATA_MNT_POINT + "/misc/vold/user_keys"; +const std::string user_key_temp = user_key_dir + "/temp"; + +bool s_global_de_initialized = false; + +// Some users are ephemeral, don't try to wipe their keys from disk +std::set s_ephemeral_users; + +// Map user ids to key references +std::map s_de_key_raw_refs; +std::map s_ce_key_raw_refs; +// TODO abolish this map. Keys should not be long-lived in user memory, only kernel memory. +// See b/26948053 +std::map s_ce_keys; + +// ext4enc:TODO get this const from somewhere good +const int EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE = 8; + +// ext4enc:TODO Include structure from somewhere sensible +// MUST be in sync with ext4_crypto.c in kernel +constexpr int EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS = 1; +constexpr int EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE = 64; +constexpr int EXT4_MAX_KEY_SIZE = 64; +struct ext4_encryption_key { + uint32_t mode; + char raw[EXT4_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; + uint32_t size; +}; +} + +static bool e4crypt_is_emulated() { + return false; //property_get_bool("persist.sys.emulate_fbe", false); +} + +static const char* escape_null(const char* value) { + return (value == nullptr) ? "null" : value; +} + +// Get raw keyref - used to make keyname and to pass to ioctl +static std::string generate_key_ref(const char* key, int length) { + SHA512_CTX c; + + SHA512_Init(&c); + SHA512_Update(&c, key, length); + unsigned char key_ref1[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + SHA512_Final(key_ref1, &c); + + SHA512_Init(&c); + SHA512_Update(&c, key_ref1, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH); + unsigned char key_ref2[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + SHA512_Final(key_ref2, &c); + + static_assert(EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE <= SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, + "Hash too short for descriptor"); + return std::string((char*)key_ref2, EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE); +} + +static bool fill_key(const std::string& key, ext4_encryption_key* ext4_key) { + if (key.size() != EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE) { + LOG(ERROR) << "Wrong size key " << key.size(); + return false; + } + static_assert(EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE <= sizeof(ext4_key->raw), "Key too long!"); + ext4_key->mode = EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS; + ext4_key->size = key.size(); + memset(ext4_key->raw, 0, sizeof(ext4_key->raw)); + memcpy(ext4_key->raw, key.data(), key.size()); + return true; +} + +static std::string keyname(const std::string& raw_ref) { + std::ostringstream o; + o << "ext4:"; + for (auto i : raw_ref) { + o << std::hex << std::setw(2) << std::setfill('0') << (int)i; + } + LOG(INFO) << "keyname is " << o.str() << "\n"; + return o.str(); +} + +// Get the keyring we store all keys in +static bool e4crypt_keyring(key_serial_t* device_keyring) { + *device_keyring = keyctl_search(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, "keyring", "e4crypt", 0); + if (*device_keyring == -1) { + PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to find device keyring\n"; + return false; + } + return true; +} + +// Install password into global keyring +// Return raw key reference for use in policy +static bool install_key(const std::string& key, std::string* raw_ref) { + ext4_encryption_key ext4_key; + if (!fill_key(key, &ext4_key)) return false; + *raw_ref = generate_key_ref(ext4_key.raw, ext4_key.size); + auto ref = keyname(*raw_ref); + key_serial_t device_keyring; + if (!e4crypt_keyring(&device_keyring)) return false; + key_serial_t key_id = + add_key("logon", ref.c_str(), (void*)&ext4_key, sizeof(ext4_key), device_keyring); + if (key_id == -1) { + PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to insert key into keyring " << device_keyring << "\n"; + return false; + } + LOG(DEBUG) << "Added key " << key_id << " (" << ref << ") to keyring " << device_keyring + << " in process " << getpid() << "\n"; + return true; +} + +static std::string get_de_key_path(userid_t user_id) { +LOG(INFO) << "get_de_key_path " << user_id << " " << StringPrintf("%s/de/%d", user_key_dir.c_str(), user_id) << "\n"; + return StringPrintf("%s/de/%d", user_key_dir.c_str(), user_id); +} + +static std::string get_ce_key_directory_path(userid_t user_id) { +LOG(INFO) << "get_ce_key_directory_path " << user_id << ": " << StringPrintf("%s/ce/%d", user_key_dir.c_str(), user_id) << "\n"; + return StringPrintf("%s/ce/%d", user_key_dir.c_str(), user_id); +} + +// Returns the keys newest first +static std::vector get_ce_key_paths(const std::string& directory_path) { + auto dirp = std::unique_ptr(opendir(directory_path.c_str()), closedir); + if (!dirp) { + PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to open ce key directory: " + directory_path; + return std::vector(); + } + std::vector result; + for (;;) { + errno = 0; + auto const entry = readdir(dirp.get()); + if (!entry) { + if (errno) { + PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to read ce key directory: " + directory_path; + return std::vector(); + } + break; + } + if (entry->d_type != DT_DIR || entry->d_name[0] != 'c') { + LOG(DEBUG) << "Skipping non-key " << entry->d_name; + continue; + } + result.emplace_back(directory_path + "/" + entry->d_name); + LOG(INFO) << "get_ce_key_paths adding: " << directory_path + "/" + entry->d_name << "\n"; + } + std::sort(result.begin(), result.end()); + std::reverse(result.begin(), result.end()); + return result; +} + +static std::string get_ce_key_current_path(const std::string& directory_path) { +LOG(INFO) << "get_ce_key_current_path: " << directory_path + "/current\n"; + return directory_path + "/current"; +} + +// Discard all keys but the named one; rename it to canonical name. +// No point in acting on errors in this; ignore them. +static void fixate_user_ce_key(const std::string& directory_path, const std::string &to_fix, + const std::vector& paths) { + for (auto const other_path: paths) { + if (other_path != to_fix) { + android::vold::destroyKey(other_path); + } + } + auto const current_path = get_ce_key_current_path(directory_path); + if (to_fix != current_path) { + LOG(DEBUG) << "Renaming " << to_fix << " to " << current_path; + if (rename(to_fix.c_str(), current_path.c_str()) != 0) { + PLOG(WARNING) << "Unable to rename " << to_fix << " to " << current_path; + } + } +} + +static bool read_and_fixate_user_ce_key(userid_t user_id, + const android::vold::KeyAuthentication& auth, + std::string *ce_key) { + auto const directory_path = get_ce_key_directory_path(user_id); + auto const paths = get_ce_key_paths(directory_path); + for (auto const ce_key_path: paths) { + LOG(DEBUG) << "Trying user CE key " << ce_key_path; + if (android::vold::retrieveKey(ce_key_path, auth, ce_key)) { + LOG(DEBUG) << "Successfully retrieved key"; + fixate_user_ce_key(directory_path, ce_key_path, paths); + return true; + } + } + LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to find working ce key for user " << user_id; + return false; +} + +static bool read_and_install_user_ce_key(userid_t user_id, + const android::vold::KeyAuthentication& auth) { + if (s_ce_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) != 0) return true; + std::string ce_key; + if (!read_and_fixate_user_ce_key(user_id, auth, &ce_key)) return false; + std::string ce_raw_ref; + if (!install_key(ce_key, &ce_raw_ref)) return false; + s_ce_keys[user_id] = ce_key; + s_ce_key_raw_refs[user_id] = ce_raw_ref; + LOG(DEBUG) << "Installed ce key for user " << user_id; + return true; +} + +static bool prepare_dir(const std::string& dir, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { + LOG(DEBUG) << "Preparing: " << dir << "\n"; + return true; + return access(dir.c_str(), F_OK) == 0; // we don't want recovery creating directories or changing permissions at this point, so we will just return true if the path already exists + if (fs_prepare_dir(dir.c_str(), mode, uid, gid) != 0) { + PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to prepare " << dir; + return false; + } + return true; +} + +static bool path_exists(const std::string& path) { + return access(path.c_str(), F_OK) == 0; +} + +static bool lookup_key_ref(const std::map& key_map, userid_t user_id, + std::string* raw_ref) { + auto refi = key_map.find(user_id); + if (refi == key_map.end()) { + LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot find key for " << user_id; + return false; + } + *raw_ref = refi->second; + return true; +} + +static bool ensure_policy(const std::string& raw_ref, const std::string& path) { + LOG(INFO) << "ensure_policy '" << path << "'\n"; + return true; + return access(path.c_str(), F_OK) == 0; // ensure policy will set a policy if one is not set on an empty folder - we don't want to do this in recovery + /*if (e4crypt_policy_ensure(path.c_str(), raw_ref.data(), raw_ref.size()) != 0) { + LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set policy on: " << path << "\n"; + return false; + } + return true;*/ +} + +static bool is_numeric(const char* name) { + for (const char* p = name; *p != '\0'; p++) { + if (!isdigit(*p)) return false; + } + return true; +} + +static bool load_all_de_keys() { + auto de_dir = user_key_dir + "/de"; + auto dirp = std::unique_ptr(opendir(de_dir.c_str()), closedir); + if (!dirp) { + PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to read de key directory"; + return false; + } + for (;;) { + errno = 0; + auto entry = readdir(dirp.get()); + if (!entry) { + if (errno) { + PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to read de key directory"; + return false; + } + break; + } + if (entry->d_type != DT_DIR || !is_numeric(entry->d_name)) { + LOG(DEBUG) << "Skipping non-de-key " << entry->d_name; + continue; + } + userid_t user_id = atoi(entry->d_name); + if (s_de_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) == 0) { + auto key_path = de_dir + "/" + entry->d_name; + std::string key; + if (!android::vold::retrieveKey(key_path, kEmptyAuthentication, &key)) return false; + std::string raw_ref; + if (!install_key(key, &raw_ref)) return false; + s_de_key_raw_refs[user_id] = raw_ref; + LOG(DEBUG) << "Installed de key for user " << user_id; + } + } + // ext4enc:TODO: go through all DE directories, ensure that all user dirs have the + // correct policy set on them, and that no rogue ones exist. + return true; +} + +bool e4crypt_initialize_global_de() { + + if (s_global_de_initialized) { + LOG(INFO) << "Already initialized\n"; + return true; + } + + std::string device_key; + if (path_exists(device_key_path)) { + if (!android::vold::retrieveKey(device_key_path, + kEmptyAuthentication, &device_key)) return false; + } else { + LOG(INFO) << "NOT Creating new key\n"; + return false; + } + + std::string device_key_ref; + if (!install_key(device_key, &device_key_ref)) { + LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to install device key\n"; + return false; + } + + s_global_de_initialized = true; + return true; +} + +bool e4crypt_init_user0() { + if (e4crypt_is_native()) { + if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir, 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false; + if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir + "/ce", 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false; + if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir + "/de", 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false; + if (!path_exists(get_de_key_path(0))) { + //if (!create_and_install_user_keys(0, false)) return false; + printf("de key path not found\n"); + return false; + } + // TODO: switch to loading only DE_0 here once framework makes + // explicit calls to install DE keys for secondary users + if (!load_all_de_keys()) return false; + } + // We can only safely prepare DE storage here, since CE keys are probably + // entangled with user credentials. The framework will always prepare CE + // storage once CE keys are installed. + if (!e4crypt_prepare_user_storage(nullptr, 0, 0, FLAG_STORAGE_DE)) { + LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to prepare user 0 storage"; + return false; + } + + // If this is a non-FBE device that recently left an emulated mode, + // restore user data directories to known-good state. + if (!e4crypt_is_native() && !e4crypt_is_emulated()) { + e4crypt_unlock_user_key(0, 0, "!", "!"); + } + + return true; +} + +static bool parse_hex(const char* hex, std::string* result) { + if (strcmp("!", hex) == 0) { + *result = ""; + return true; + } + if (android::vold::HexToStr(hex, *result) != 0) { + LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid FBE hex string"; // Don't log the string for security reasons + return false; + } + return true; +} + +// TODO: rename to 'install' for consistency, and take flags to know which keys to install +bool e4crypt_unlock_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial, const char* token_hex, + const char* secret_hex) { + if (e4crypt_is_native()) { + if (s_ce_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) != 0) { + LOG(WARNING) << "Tried to unlock already-unlocked key for user " << user_id; + return true; + } + std::string token, secret; + if (!parse_hex(token_hex, &token)) return false; + if (!parse_hex(secret_hex, &secret)) return false; + android::vold::KeyAuthentication auth(token, secret); + if (!read_and_install_user_ce_key(user_id, auth)) { + LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't read key for " << user_id; + return false; + } + } else { + printf("Emulation mode not supported in TWRP\n"); + // When in emulation mode, we just use chmod. However, we also + // unlock directories when not in emulation mode, to bring devices + // back into a known-good state. + /*if (!emulated_unlock(android::vold::BuildDataSystemCePath(user_id), 0771) || + !emulated_unlock(android::vold::BuildDataMiscCePath(user_id), 01771) || + !emulated_unlock(android::vold::BuildDataMediaCePath(nullptr, user_id), 0770) || + !emulated_unlock(android::vold::BuildDataUserCePath(nullptr, user_id), 0771)) { + LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to unlock user " << user_id; + return false; + }*/ + } + return true; +} + +bool e4crypt_prepare_user_storage(const char* volume_uuid, userid_t user_id, int serial, + int flags) { + + if (flags & FLAG_STORAGE_DE) { + // DE_sys key + auto system_legacy_path = android::vold::BuildDataSystemLegacyPath(user_id); + auto misc_legacy_path = android::vold::BuildDataMiscLegacyPath(user_id); + auto profiles_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataProfilesDePath(user_id); + auto foreign_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataProfilesForeignDexDePath(user_id); + + // DE_n key + auto system_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataSystemDePath(user_id); + auto misc_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataMiscDePath(user_id); + auto user_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataUserDePath(volume_uuid, user_id); + + if (!prepare_dir(system_legacy_path, 0700, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM)) return false; +#if MANAGE_MISC_DIRS + if (!prepare_dir(misc_legacy_path, 0750, multiuser_get_uid(user_id, AID_SYSTEM), + multiuser_get_uid(user_id, AID_EVERYBODY))) return false; +#endif + if (!prepare_dir(profiles_de_path, 0771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM)) return false; + if (!prepare_dir(foreign_de_path, 0773, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM)) return false; + + if (!prepare_dir(system_de_path, 0770, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM)) return false; + if (!prepare_dir(misc_de_path, 01771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_MISC)) return false; + if (!prepare_dir(user_de_path, 0771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM)) return false; + + // For now, FBE is only supported on internal storage + if (e4crypt_is_native() && volume_uuid == nullptr) { + std::string de_raw_ref; + if (!lookup_key_ref(s_de_key_raw_refs, user_id, &de_raw_ref)) return false; + if (!ensure_policy(de_raw_ref, system_de_path)) return false; + if (!ensure_policy(de_raw_ref, misc_de_path)) return false; + if (!ensure_policy(de_raw_ref, user_de_path)) return false; + } + } + + if (flags & FLAG_STORAGE_CE) { + // CE_n key + auto system_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataSystemCePath(user_id); + auto misc_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataMiscCePath(user_id); + auto media_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataMediaCePath(volume_uuid, user_id); + auto user_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataUserCePath(volume_uuid, user_id); + + if (!prepare_dir(system_ce_path, 0770, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM)) return false; + if (!prepare_dir(misc_ce_path, 01771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_MISC)) return false; + if (!prepare_dir(media_ce_path, 0770, AID_MEDIA_RW, AID_MEDIA_RW)) return false; + if (!prepare_dir(user_ce_path, 0771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM)) return false; + + // For now, FBE is only supported on internal storage + if (e4crypt_is_native() && volume_uuid == nullptr) { + std::string ce_raw_ref; + if (!lookup_key_ref(s_ce_key_raw_refs, user_id, &ce_raw_ref)) return false; + if (!ensure_policy(ce_raw_ref, system_ce_path)) return false; + if (!ensure_policy(ce_raw_ref, misc_ce_path)) return false; + if (!ensure_policy(ce_raw_ref, media_ce_path)) return false; + if (!ensure_policy(ce_raw_ref, user_ce_path)) return false; + } + } + + return true; +} -- cgit v1.2.3