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author | Ethan Yonker <dees_troy@teamw.in> | 2014-11-06 15:35:10 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Ethan Yonker <dees_troy@teamw.in> | 2014-11-06 15:35:13 +0100 |
commit | a167416289a8aef5d4c35861c9f4181f87b8bfd0 (patch) | |
tree | cfb0b940141a4273ac6ddb58070e36ea706b7358 /verifier.cpp | |
parent | 2.8.2.0 (diff) | |
parent | Use more aggressive sync writing to applypatch. (diff) | |
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Diffstat (limited to 'verifier.cpp')
-rw-r--r-- | verifier.cpp | 298 |
1 files changed, 214 insertions, 84 deletions
diff --git a/verifier.cpp b/verifier.cpp index ccc0742d2..b96ba3a0d 100644 --- a/verifier.cpp +++ b/verifier.cpp @@ -14,10 +14,14 @@ * limitations under the License. */ +#include "asn1_decoder.h" #include "common.h" -#include "verifier.h" #include "ui.h" +#include "verifier.h" +#include "mincrypt/dsa_sig.h" +#include "mincrypt/p256.h" +#include "mincrypt/p256_ecdsa.h" #include "mincrypt/rsa.h" #include "mincrypt/sha.h" #include "mincrypt/sha256.h" @@ -30,13 +34,85 @@ #define PUBLIC_KEYS_FILE "/res/keys" +/* + * Simple version of PKCS#7 SignedData extraction. This extracts the + * signature OCTET STRING to be used for signature verification. + * + * For full details, see http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3852.txt + * + * The PKCS#7 structure looks like: + * + * SEQUENCE (ContentInfo) + * OID (ContentType) + * [0] (content) + * SEQUENCE (SignedData) + * INTEGER (version CMSVersion) + * SET (DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers) + * SEQUENCE (EncapsulatedContentInfo) + * [0] (CertificateSet OPTIONAL) + * [1] (RevocationInfoChoices OPTIONAL) + * SET (SignerInfos) + * SEQUENCE (SignerInfo) + * INTEGER (CMSVersion) + * SEQUENCE (SignerIdentifier) + * SEQUENCE (DigestAlgorithmIdentifier) + * SEQUENCE (SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier) + * OCTET STRING (SignatureValue) + */ +static bool read_pkcs7(uint8_t* pkcs7_der, size_t pkcs7_der_len, uint8_t** sig_der, + size_t* sig_der_length) { + asn1_context_t* ctx = asn1_context_new(pkcs7_der, pkcs7_der_len); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return false; + } + + asn1_context_t* pkcs7_seq = asn1_sequence_get(ctx); + if (pkcs7_seq != NULL && asn1_sequence_next(pkcs7_seq)) { + asn1_context_t *signed_data_app = asn1_constructed_get(pkcs7_seq); + if (signed_data_app != NULL) { + asn1_context_t* signed_data_seq = asn1_sequence_get(signed_data_app); + if (signed_data_seq != NULL + && asn1_sequence_next(signed_data_seq) + && asn1_sequence_next(signed_data_seq) + && asn1_sequence_next(signed_data_seq) + && asn1_constructed_skip_all(signed_data_seq)) { + asn1_context_t *sig_set = asn1_set_get(signed_data_seq); + if (sig_set != NULL) { + asn1_context_t* sig_seq = asn1_sequence_get(sig_set); + if (sig_seq != NULL + && asn1_sequence_next(sig_seq) + && asn1_sequence_next(sig_seq) + && asn1_sequence_next(sig_seq) + && asn1_sequence_next(sig_seq)) { + uint8_t* sig_der_ptr; + if (asn1_octet_string_get(sig_seq, &sig_der_ptr, sig_der_length)) { + *sig_der = (uint8_t*) malloc(*sig_der_length); + if (*sig_der != NULL) { + memcpy(*sig_der, sig_der_ptr, *sig_der_length); + } + } + asn1_context_free(sig_seq); + } + asn1_context_free(sig_set); + } + asn1_context_free(signed_data_seq); + } + asn1_context_free(signed_data_app); + } + asn1_context_free(pkcs7_seq); + } + asn1_context_free(ctx); + + return *sig_der != NULL; +} + // Look for an RSA signature embedded in the .ZIP file comment given // the path to the zip. Verify it matches one of the given public // keys. // // Return VERIFY_SUCCESS, VERIFY_FAILURE (if any error is encountered // or no key matches the signature). -int verify_file(const char* path) { +int verify_file(unsigned char* addr, size_t length) { //ui->SetProgress(0.0); int numKeys; @@ -47,12 +123,6 @@ int verify_file(const char* path) { } LOGI("%d key(s) loaded from %s\n", numKeys, PUBLIC_KEYS_FILE); - FILE* f = fopen(path, "rb"); - if (f == NULL) { - LOGE("failed to open %s (%s)\n", path, strerror(errno)); - return VERIFY_FAILURE; - } - // An archive with a whole-file signature will end in six bytes: // // (2-byte signature start) $ff $ff (2-byte comment size) @@ -64,34 +134,25 @@ int verify_file(const char* path) { #define FOOTER_SIZE 6 - if (fseek(f, -FOOTER_SIZE, SEEK_END) != 0) { - LOGE("failed to seek in %s (%s)\n", path, strerror(errno)); - fclose(f); + if (length < FOOTER_SIZE) { + LOGE("not big enough to contain footer\n"); return VERIFY_FAILURE; } - unsigned char footer[FOOTER_SIZE]; - if (fread(footer, 1, FOOTER_SIZE, f) != FOOTER_SIZE) { - LOGE("failed to read footer from %s (%s)\n", path, strerror(errno)); - fclose(f); - return VERIFY_FAILURE; - } + unsigned char* footer = addr + length - FOOTER_SIZE; if (footer[2] != 0xff || footer[3] != 0xff) { LOGE("footer is wrong\n"); - fclose(f); return VERIFY_FAILURE; } size_t comment_size = footer[4] + (footer[5] << 8); size_t signature_start = footer[0] + (footer[1] << 8); - LOGI("comment is %d bytes; signature %d bytes from end\n", + LOGI("comment is %zu bytes; signature %zu bytes from end\n", comment_size, signature_start); - if (signature_start - FOOTER_SIZE < RSANUMBYTES) { - // "signature" block isn't big enough to contain an RSA block. - LOGE("signature is too short\n"); - fclose(f); + if (signature_start <= FOOTER_SIZE) { + LOGE("Signature start is in the footer"); return VERIFY_FAILURE; } @@ -101,9 +162,8 @@ int verify_file(const char* path) { // comment length. size_t eocd_size = comment_size + EOCD_HEADER_SIZE; - if (fseek(f, -eocd_size, SEEK_END) != 0) { - LOGE("failed to seek in %s (%s)\n", path, strerror(errno)); - fclose(f); + if (length < eocd_size) { + LOGE("not big enough to contain EOCD\n"); return VERIFY_FAILURE; } @@ -111,26 +171,15 @@ int verify_file(const char* path) { // This is everything except the signature data and length, which // includes all of the EOCD except for the comment length field (2 // bytes) and the comment data. - size_t signed_len = ftell(f) + EOCD_HEADER_SIZE - 2; + size_t signed_len = length - eocd_size + EOCD_HEADER_SIZE - 2; - unsigned char* eocd = (unsigned char*)malloc(eocd_size); - if (eocd == NULL) { - LOGE("malloc for EOCD record failed\n"); - fclose(f); - return VERIFY_FAILURE; - } - if (fread(eocd, 1, eocd_size, f) != eocd_size) { - LOGE("failed to read eocd from %s (%s)\n", path, strerror(errno)); - fclose(f); - return VERIFY_FAILURE; - } + unsigned char* eocd = addr + length - eocd_size; // If this is really is the EOCD record, it will begin with the // magic number $50 $4b $05 $06. if (eocd[0] != 0x50 || eocd[1] != 0x4b || eocd[2] != 0x05 || eocd[3] != 0x06) { LOGE("signature length doesn't match EOCD marker\n"); - fclose(f); return VERIFY_FAILURE; } @@ -143,7 +192,6 @@ int verify_file(const char* path) { // which could be exploitable. Fail verification if // this sequence occurs anywhere after the real one. LOGE("EOCD marker occurs after start of EOCD\n"); - fclose(f); return VERIFY_FAILURE; } } @@ -163,39 +211,42 @@ int verify_file(const char* path) { SHA256_CTX sha256_ctx; SHA_init(&sha1_ctx); SHA256_init(&sha256_ctx); - unsigned char* buffer = (unsigned char*)malloc(BUFFER_SIZE); - if (buffer == NULL) { - LOGE("failed to alloc memory for sha1 buffer\n"); - fclose(f); - return VERIFY_FAILURE; - } double frac = -1.0; size_t so_far = 0; - fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET); while (so_far < signed_len) { - size_t size = BUFFER_SIZE; - if (signed_len - so_far < size) size = signed_len - so_far; - if (fread(buffer, 1, size, f) != size) { - LOGE("failed to read data from %s (%s)\n", path, strerror(errno)); - fclose(f); - return VERIFY_FAILURE; - } - if (need_sha1) SHA_update(&sha1_ctx, buffer, size); - if (need_sha256) SHA256_update(&sha256_ctx, buffer, size); + size_t size = signed_len - so_far; + if (size > BUFFER_SIZE) size = BUFFER_SIZE; + + if (need_sha1) SHA_update(&sha1_ctx, addr + so_far, size); + if (need_sha256) SHA256_update(&sha256_ctx, addr + so_far, size); so_far += size; + double f = so_far / (double)signed_len; if (f > frac + 0.02 || size == so_far) { //ui->SetProgress(f); frac = f; } } - fclose(f); - free(buffer); const uint8_t* sha1 = SHA_final(&sha1_ctx); const uint8_t* sha256 = SHA256_final(&sha256_ctx); + uint8_t* sig_der = NULL; + size_t sig_der_length = 0; + + size_t signature_size = signature_start - FOOTER_SIZE; + if (!read_pkcs7(eocd + eocd_size - signature_start, signature_size, &sig_der, + &sig_der_length)) { + LOGE("Could not find signature DER block\n"); + return VERIFY_FAILURE; + } + + /* + * Check to make sure at least one of the keys matches the signature. Since + * any key can match, we need to try each before determining a verification + * failure has happened. + */ for (i = 0; i < numKeys; ++i) { const uint8_t* hash; switch (pKeys[i].hash_len) { @@ -206,17 +257,47 @@ int verify_file(const char* path) { // The 6 bytes is the "(signature_start) $ff $ff (comment_size)" that // the signing tool appends after the signature itself. - if (RSA_verify(pKeys[i].public_key, eocd + eocd_size - 6 - RSANUMBYTES, - RSANUMBYTES, hash, pKeys[i].hash_len)) { - LOGI("whole-file signature verified against key %d\n", i); - free(eocd); + if (pKeys[i].key_type == Certificate::RSA) { + if (sig_der_length < RSANUMBYTES) { + // "signature" block isn't big enough to contain an RSA block. + LOGI("signature is too short for RSA key %zu\n", i); + continue; + } + + if (!RSA_verify(pKeys[i].rsa, sig_der, RSANUMBYTES, + hash, pKeys[i].hash_len)) { + LOGI("failed to verify against RSA key %zu\n", i); + continue; + } + + LOGI("whole-file signature verified against RSA key %zu\n", i); + free(sig_der); + return VERIFY_SUCCESS; + } else if (pKeys[i].key_type == Certificate::EC + && pKeys[i].hash_len == SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) { + p256_int r, s; + if (!dsa_sig_unpack(sig_der, sig_der_length, &r, &s)) { + LOGI("Not a DSA signature block for EC key %zu\n", i); + continue; + } + + p256_int p256_hash; + p256_from_bin(hash, &p256_hash); + if (!p256_ecdsa_verify(&(pKeys[i].ec->x), &(pKeys[i].ec->y), + &p256_hash, &r, &s)) { + LOGI("failed to verify against EC key %zu\n", i); + continue; + } + + LOGI("whole-file signature verified against EC key %zu\n", i); + free(sig_der); return VERIFY_SUCCESS; } else { - LOGI("failed to verify against key %d\n", i); + LOGI("Unknown key type %d\n", pKeys[i].key_type); } LOGI("i: %i, eocd_size: %i, RSANUMBYTES: %i\n", i, eocd_size, RSANUMBYTES); } - free(eocd); + free(sig_der); LOGE("failed to verify whole-file signature\n"); return VERIFY_FAILURE; } @@ -248,6 +329,7 @@ int verify_file(const char* path) { // 2: 2048-bit RSA key with e=65537 and SHA-1 hash // 3: 2048-bit RSA key with e=3 and SHA-256 hash // 4: 2048-bit RSA key with e=65537 and SHA-256 hash +// 5: 256-bit EC key using the NIST P-256 curve parameters and SHA-256 hash // // Returns NULL if the file failed to parse, or if it contain zero keys. Certificate* @@ -268,28 +350,41 @@ load_keys(const char* filename, int* numKeys) { ++*numKeys; out = (Certificate*)realloc(out, *numKeys * sizeof(Certificate)); Certificate* cert = out + (*numKeys - 1); - cert->public_key = (RSAPublicKey*)malloc(sizeof(RSAPublicKey)); + memset(cert, '\0', sizeof(Certificate)); char start_char; if (fscanf(f, " %c", &start_char) != 1) goto exit; if (start_char == '{') { // a version 1 key has no version specifier. - cert->public_key->exponent = 3; + cert->key_type = Certificate::RSA; + cert->rsa = (RSAPublicKey*)malloc(sizeof(RSAPublicKey)); + cert->rsa->exponent = 3; cert->hash_len = SHA_DIGEST_SIZE; } else if (start_char == 'v') { int version; if (fscanf(f, "%d {", &version) != 1) goto exit; switch (version) { case 2: - cert->public_key->exponent = 65537; + cert->key_type = Certificate::RSA; + cert->rsa = (RSAPublicKey*)malloc(sizeof(RSAPublicKey)); + cert->rsa->exponent = 65537; cert->hash_len = SHA_DIGEST_SIZE; break; case 3: - cert->public_key->exponent = 3; + cert->key_type = Certificate::RSA; + cert->rsa = (RSAPublicKey*)malloc(sizeof(RSAPublicKey)); + cert->rsa->exponent = 3; cert->hash_len = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; break; case 4: - cert->public_key->exponent = 65537; + cert->key_type = Certificate::RSA; + cert->rsa = (RSAPublicKey*)malloc(sizeof(RSAPublicKey)); + cert->rsa->exponent = 65537; + cert->hash_len = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + break; + case 5: + cert->key_type = Certificate::EC; + cert->ec = (ECPublicKey*)calloc(1, sizeof(ECPublicKey)); cert->hash_len = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; break; default: @@ -297,23 +392,55 @@ load_keys(const char* filename, int* numKeys) { } } - RSAPublicKey* key = cert->public_key; - if (fscanf(f, " %i , 0x%x , { %u", - &(key->len), &(key->n0inv), &(key->n[0])) != 3) { - goto exit; - } - if (key->len != RSANUMWORDS) { - LOGE("key length (%d) does not match expected size\n", key->len); + if (cert->key_type == Certificate::RSA) { + RSAPublicKey* key = cert->rsa; + if (fscanf(f, " %i , 0x%x , { %u", + &(key->len), &(key->n0inv), &(key->n[0])) != 3) { + goto exit; + } + if (key->len != RSANUMWORDS) { + LOGE("key length (%d) does not match expected size\n", key->len); + goto exit; + } + for (i = 1; i < key->len; ++i) { + if (fscanf(f, " , %u", &(key->n[i])) != 1) goto exit; + } + if (fscanf(f, " } , { %u", &(key->rr[0])) != 1) goto exit; + for (i = 1; i < key->len; ++i) { + if (fscanf(f, " , %u", &(key->rr[i])) != 1) goto exit; + } + fscanf(f, " } } "); + + LOGI("read key e=%d hash=%d\n", key->exponent, cert->hash_len); + } else if (cert->key_type == Certificate::EC) { + ECPublicKey* key = cert->ec; + int key_len; + unsigned int byte; + uint8_t x_bytes[P256_NBYTES]; + uint8_t y_bytes[P256_NBYTES]; + if (fscanf(f, " %i , { %u", &key_len, &byte) != 2) goto exit; + if (key_len != P256_NBYTES) { + LOGE("Key length (%d) does not match expected size %d\n", key_len, P256_NBYTES); + goto exit; + } + x_bytes[P256_NBYTES - 1] = byte; + for (i = P256_NBYTES - 2; i >= 0; --i) { + if (fscanf(f, " , %u", &byte) != 1) goto exit; + x_bytes[i] = byte; + } + if (fscanf(f, " } , { %u", &byte) != 1) goto exit; + y_bytes[P256_NBYTES - 1] = byte; + for (i = P256_NBYTES - 2; i >= 0; --i) { + if (fscanf(f, " , %u", &byte) != 1) goto exit; + y_bytes[i] = byte; + } + fscanf(f, " } } "); + p256_from_bin(x_bytes, &key->x); + p256_from_bin(y_bytes, &key->y); + } else { + LOGE("Unknown key type %d\n", cert->key_type); goto exit; } - for (i = 1; i < key->len; ++i) { - if (fscanf(f, " , %u", &(key->n[i])) != 1) goto exit; - } - if (fscanf(f, " } , { %u", &(key->rr[0])) != 1) goto exit; - for (i = 1; i < key->len; ++i) { - if (fscanf(f, " , %u", &(key->rr[i])) != 1) goto exit; - } - fscanf(f, " } } "); // if the line ends in a comma, this file has more keys. switch (fgetc(f)) { @@ -329,7 +456,10 @@ load_keys(const char* filename, int* numKeys) { LOGE("unexpected character between keys\n"); goto exit; } +<<<<<<< HEAD LOGI("read key e=%d hash=%d\n", key->exponent, cert->hash_len); +======= +>>>>>>> cddb68b5eafbeba696d5276bda1f1a9f70bbde42 } } |